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WHOM (OR WHAT) DOES THE ORGANIZATION'S
LAWYER REPRESENT?:
An Anatomy of Intra-client Conflict
William H. Simon*
Professional responsibility issues involving organizational
clients are distinctively difficult because organizations consist of
constituents with conflicting interests. Doctrine has only recently
begun to address the effect of internal conflict on a lawyer's
responsibilities to an organizational client. The results have been
inconsistent and often implausible. This article surveys current
approaches and offers recommendations for improvement. It
analyzes the distinction between "joint" representation and "entity"
representation and argues that the differences between them
should not be as great as conventional discussion assumes. With
respect to the notion of "entity" representation, it criticizes a
prominent tendency in the cases to conflate the interests of the
organization as an "entity" with the goals of its incumbent
management. It also criticizes the approach of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, which identifies the "entity" with its authority structure.
These approaches suffer from the influence of anachronistic
corporate law doctrine that implies that the interests that
constitute a corporation's identity do not include norms of fair
distribution among its constituents. An adequate understanding of
organizational representation requires a view of the corporation
as a Framework of Dealing that includes both procedural and
distributive norms.
The analysis focuses primarily on
corporations, but a concluding section suggests that it also applies
to other organizational forms.
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I. Introduction
A large fraction of the bar spends most of its time
representing organizations. The law tends to characterize these
organizations as unitary "entities" or "legal persons" and to suggest
that lawyers' duties to such clients are analogous to their duties to
individual clients. In fact, however, these organizations are
constituted by multiple individuals with potentially differing
interests and hence are prone to internal conflict of a kind that
cannot occur with individual clients.
For most of the bar's history, there was little discussion of
such conflicts, but a substantial body of authority has emerged in
recent years applying both substantive business doctrine and
professional responsibility norms to lawyers in situations of what
might be called intra-client conflict. For the most part, this
authority responds to three broad categories of claim:
-- The lawyer is charged with breach of duty, as a
matter of either professional discipline or tort liability, for assisting
or acquiescing in conduct by one group of organizational
constituents that allegedly wrongfully injures another; for example,
a dominant shareholder group expropriates the interests of a
minority.
-- Either the organization or a constituent argues
that the lawyer is subject to disqualification on conflict-of-interest
grounds.
-- An organizational constituent alleging
management
wrongdoing
seeks
access
to
privileged
communications between management and counsel.
Doctrinal responses to these issues have been incoherent
and implausible. This essay offers some suggestions designed to
clarify thinking about organizational representation and some
specific suggestions for current controversies. It criticizes a quite
common tendency to invoke the idea of entity representation in an
unreflective and question-begging way. Often the interests of the
organization are conflated with those of management. A more
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sophisticated approach, exemplified by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, treats the organization as a structure of authority. Even
this approach is inadequate in many situations, however. The
essay argues that a satisfactory approach would understand the
corporation as a Framework of Dealing, a set of procedural and
substantive terms grounded in the understandings of the
organization's constituents and supplemented by publicly provided
default and mandatory terms.
The Framework-of-Dealing perspective reflects the most
plausible jurisprudential understanding of the nature of
organizations. However, it entails revision of some anachronistic
corporate doctrine, such as the distinction between "direct" and
"derivative" constituent claims, that has had an unfortunate
influence on professional responsibility. This doctrine implies a
conception of organizational identity in which the organization is
indifferent to the integrity of its distributive arrangements. A more
plausible understanding of organizations can be seen in a variety of
recent developments that conventional analysis portrays as
anomalous.
I begin with a hypothetical to illustrate the issues. The
hypothetical uses a close corporation because the problems with
present doctrine are most easily seen in this context, but I will later
suggest that the analysis developed in response to this situation
applies as well to larger organizations. I proceed to contrast joint
representation of individuals with organizational representation
and to consider suggestions that joint representation norms should
be applied to some clients that are at least in form organizations. I
then consider three interpretations of the idea of organizational or
"entity" representation. The first identifies the corporation with its
Control Group; the second, with its Authority Structure, and the
third, with a comprehensive Framework-of-Dealing. I argue that
the latter perspective is most promising. The analysis is developed
for the most part with reference to business corporations. Toward
the end, I consider authority on a variety of other types of
organizations -- partnerships, trusts, charitable organiztions, and
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informal associations -- and conclude that the Framework of
Dealing perspective fits these contexts as well.
II. A False Start -- Doctrinal Circularity
THE FOUNDER FREEZE-OUT
Founder is the principal entrepreneur and technical
spirit in a hi-tech corporation. He is an engineer who
developed a new kind of gizmo -- a critical component of
various electronics products. Shortly after Founder set up
the corporation, Investor, a venture capital partnership,
became a major shareholder. Investor owns preferred
stock, and under relevant terms of the Articles of
Organization, it is entitled to take control of the board if
specified financial milestones are not met, including one
regarding revenues.
Product development and marketing efforts have
exceeded expectations, but the enterprise encountered some
unanticipated production problems.
Soon thereafter,
Investor asserted that the revenue milestone had not been
met, and with Founder's acquiescence, assumed control.
The Investor-controlled board then informed Founder that
his services as an employee were no longer needed by the
firm. The board exercised the firm's option to repurchase
Founder's stock on his departure from the firm. Half of
these shares were unvested and hence were subject to
repurchase at the price Founder paid for them, which was a
small fraction of their market value. The Board majority
also voted to remove Founder as a director.
One of the Investor directors has told corporate
counsel that, according to the firm's accountant, the
judgment that the milestone has not been met -- the basis
for Investor's assumption of control of the Board -- rests on
a debatable accounting judgment (about, say, when orders
should be booked). "It could have gone either way," the
accountant said. Founder is unaware of this, and neither

5

SIMON

the accountant nor the directors have any intention of
telling him of it. What should corporate counsel do?
Perhaps the most strongly supported position is that counsel
has no duty to inform Founder and may have a duty not to do so.
There is also ample support for the proposition that counsel may
represent the corporation in litigation with Founder over his
separation. And there is authority that the board will be able to
invoke attorney-client privilege to preclude Founder from deposing
counsel in the litigation. As we will see, there is also differing
authority with respect to each of these issues, and indeed the last
position on attorney-client privilege appears to be a minority one.
But few cases or commentators have confronted the flawed logic
that pervades this body of doctrine.
The holdings against the shareholder are usually supported
with the claim that "corporate counsel represents the corporation,
not its constituents." This precept is typically invoked without
elaboration as if it were sufficient on its face to dispose of the
shareholders claim. In fact, this precept merely raises the question
of what the corporation's interests are in the circumstances of the
case, and the implicit answer the cases give is often highly
implausible.
To take an extreme, but far from unique, case, consider
Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, in which the plaintiff
was one of four shareholders in an insurance brokerage
corporation. He had a falling-out with his colleagues, and they
agreed to repurchase his shares. After his departure, they reneged
on the repurchase agreement and instead "deliberately embarked
on a scheme to diminish [his]interest in the corporation by diluting
his stock in violation of their fiduciary duties." 1 The scheme
included the filing articles of amendment eliminating the plaintiff's
pre-emptive rights to new shares with a declaration falsely reciting
that the amendment had been duly approved at a shareholder
meeting. Although the court's factual recitation suggested that the
1

Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 637
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
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lawyer may have engaged in affirmatively fraudulent acts, the
plaintiff apparently argued only that he had a duty to make timely
disclosures to him of the officers' conduct. This the appeal court
denied, opining that the lawyer's duty was to the corporation and
not to Skarbrevik, whom it characterized as someone "dealing with
the corporation at arm's length" with interests "adverse" to those of
the corporation.2
In this and similar cases, the Court, after invoking the
principle that counsel's duty is to the corporation, never proceeds
to consider what that duty requires, and in particular, how it could
be consistent with that duty to facilitate the expropriation of
interests that the corporate structure allocates to the plaintiff.3
2

282 Cal. Rptr. at 637, 638. This was a direct action, but the case gives
no indication that the court would have looked more favorably on the claim had
the action been derivative. The Court's characterization of the plaintiff's interest
as "adverse" to the corporation would seem to preclude derivative claims. In
any event, the distinction between direct and derivative is pointless in a case
where the plaintiff sues for conduct in which all the other shareholders
participated. See the discussion below at
.
3
A case with facts, analysis, and conclusion remarkably similar to
Skarbrevik is Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 1988).
The best known case of this sort is Fasihi v. Sommers, Schwartz,
Silver, Schwartz and Tyler, 309 N.W. 2d 645 (Mich. 1981). The case is
sometimes treated as more nuanced than Skarbrevik and Felty, but the thrust is
similar. Fasihi involved a corporation owned by two doctors, both of whom
were on the board. Corporate counsel helped the corporation's chief executive,
Dr. Lopez, oust the plaintiff, Fasihi, as a corporate employee. Unknown to
Fasihi, corporate counsel had simultaneously represented Lopez in negotiating a
contract between Lopez and a hospital making employment by the corporation a
condition of admitting privileges in the hospital. In consequence of this private
agreement, Fasihi's expulsion from the corporation led to his loss of hospital
privileges. The issues considered in the opinion were whether corporate counsel
had a duty to inform Fasihi of (a) his separate individual representation of
Lopez, or (b) Lopez's agreement with the hospital.
The court held that the lawyer should have informed Fasihi of the
separate indidividual representation but not of the contract. It suggested that
lawyers have a limited duty to nonclients who repose "trust and confidence" in
them and that this duty extends to the disclosure of conflicting representations.
The holding could be interpreted to recognize limited but ambiguous fiduciary
duties of corporate counsel to constituents. There is, however, a cleaner
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The same tendency can be found in discussions of
disqualification of corporate counsel in shareholder litigation.
Most lawyers think it uncontroversial that corporate counsel can
represent the corporation in a dispute with a constituent such as
Founder, assuming that she has never represented him individually.
If the only client has been the corporation, then Founder is neither
a present nor a former client, and there is no conflict that might
disqualify.4
This analysis involves two assumptions. First, it assumes
that representing the corporation when Founder is its only
shareholder, prior to Investor's investment, is fundamentally
different from representing Founder. Lawyers representing startup companies looking for venture financing routinely ask the
founders to sign letters acknowledging that counsel represents the
corporation and not the founders individually and suggesting that
the founders consider seeking separate individual representation.
In fact, the founders never seek separate representation, and were
they to do so, no one has any idea what the additional lawyer
would do. At this stage, it seems impossible to draw any
distinction between individual and corporate interests. Lawyers'
insistence on the distinction seems to have little function other than
to preserve their ability to align themselves against the founders
should a dispute arise after the outside investment.
explanation for it than the one the court gives. Model Rule 4.3 creates a duty to
unrepresented nonclients, even complete strangers, "[w]hen the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer's role in the matter … to make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding."
The rest of the opinion has the same cavalier and conclusory tone of
Skarbrevik. The court rules that counsel rightly failed to disclose the hospital
contract because of his duty of confidentiality to Lopez as an individual client
without even acknowledging the issue of whether his duty to his corporate client
required disclosure Fasihi, as a shareholder and board member.
4

See Seifert v. Dumatic Industries, 413 Pa. 395, 197 A.2d 454 (1964)
(counsel for two-person corporation not disqualified from representing
corporation against one of the shareholders).
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The second assumption is that at the time of the dispute
incumbent management represents the interests of the corporation.
This is a normal presumption, but the purpose of a claim such as
Founder's is to challenge it. Almost any shareholder suit
challenges management's authority, and in a derivative suit, the
constituent purports explicitly to speak for the corporation. But the
conventional treatment simply conflates the corporation's interests
with the views of incumbent management.
To be sure, a prevalent view holds that, while corporate
counsel may be able to represent the corporation, it should not
jointly represent the corporation and the managers individually if
the suit accuses the latter of individual wrongdoing.5 Under this
view, Investor would have to get separate counsel for itself as an
individual. But some authority rejects even this qualification and
holds that, not only can counsel represent the corporation, it can
jointly represent the officers personally, at least if the current board
"consents" on behalf of the corporation to the joint representation.
This is the conclusion of an opinion of the California State Bar
ethics committee in a case involving, like our hypothetical,
litigation between the only two stakeholders of a corporation. The
committee concludes that the shareholder-CEO (the counterpart of
Investor in our scenario) can consent to joint representation. "To
conclude otherwise," it says, "would permit … the Corporation's
adversary in the lawsuit to dictate how the Corporation would be
represented in that proceeding."6 Again, we get no explanation of
why the plaintiff should be regarded as the corporation's
"adversary."
Courts that allow the corporation to invoke attorney-client
privilege against a derivative plaintiff follow the same logic. For
example, the California Supreme Court explained that it lacked the
5

See the authority cited in notes
, below.
California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion 1999-153. (In the opinion, the
shareholder in control of the corporation, to whom the opinion ascribes the right
to consent to joint representation, is identified as "A".) For more authority on
the role of corporate counsel in derivative suits, see below
.
6
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authority to create an "exception" to an evidentiary privilege
enacted by the legislature.7 Even without an exception, however,
the question of who speaks for the corporation in deciding whether
to invoke the privilege remained, but the court felt no need to
explain its decision against the plaintiff on this matter.
In all these cases, then, the court treats the principle of
corporate representation as conclusive against the constituent's
claim by tacitly conflating the interests of the corporation with
those of its senior incumbent officers. Once articulated, this view
becomes considerably harder to defend, but it does have a
legitimate role to play in specifying the meaning of corporate
representation. It is, however, only one of at least three important
interpretations of entity representation, and it is less useful for
dealing with cases such as the Founder Freeze-Out than the other
two. Before we consider the alternative conceptions of entity
representation, however, we must consider an alternative approach
to some issues of organizational representation that dispenses with
the entity concept entirely.
III. Organizational Representation as Joint Representation
A. Joint v. Entity Representation
Suppose in the Freeze-Out case Founder and Investor had
come to the lawyer as individuals and asked the lawyer to assist
them in conducting their activities without any organization.
The lawyer's activities would thus have been joint
representation of Founder and Investor. If that had been the case,
then her obligations to Founder once the dispute with Investor
arose would have been as follows:
-- Conflicts. (1) Prior to undertaking to represent them
jointly, she should have warned Founder of the dangers of conflict
with Investor, to the extent they were foreseeable. (2) She should

7

Dickerson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, (1982).
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have withdrawn from at least one, and probably, both
representations when conflict became manifest.8
-- Confidentiality. No confidentiality duty to Investor
would prevent her giving material information to Founder. And in
fact:
-- Fiduciary Duty. She would have a duty to inform
Founder of the accountant's statement.9
The lawyer's duties to joint clients are clearer than those to
organizations, and insofar as we can determine the latter, they are
nearly the opposite of those suggested by the cases on
organizational representation discussed in the last section.
Why should joint and organizational representation be
treated so differently? The doctrine offers no ready answer, and it
is surprisingly difficult to formulate one from scratch.
One explanation that can be dismissed is the practical limits
on lawyer attention to multiple individuals. There's a tendency to
assume that organizations involve large numbers of constituents,
most of whom have no direct contact with the organization's
lawyers, while joint representation involves small numbers of
people in direct contact with the lawyer. It might seem that, once
the numbers get large enough, it would become impossible to give
each constituent the kind of attention that the joint representation
model contemplates. Obviously, however, these assumptions are
often inapplicable. Our Founder Freeze-out scenario is an example
of a large classs of small business clients who take the form of
8

Model Rule 1.9, which prohibits representing someone against a former
client in a matter "substantially related" to the former representation, implies
that, when a joint representation breaks down, the lawyer must cease
representing both clients (unless both will consent to the continued
representation of one). See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants', Inc., 590
F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979). Some cases, however, take a less strict approach,
emphasizing that continued representation of one client does not threaten any
confidentiality interest, since joint clients waive confidentiality between
themselves. E.g., American Special Risk Insurance Co. v. Delta America
Insurance Co., 634 F.Sup. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y.1986).
9
E.g., Model Rule 1.4 (lawyer to provide client with information
necessary for "informed" decisions).
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organizations but involve small numbers of people. There is no
practical obstacle to the lawyer considering their interests
individually.
Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that, even where
the lawyer must be concerned with numbers of people too large for
detailed individual attention, treating them as an "entity" in the
manner we are discussing is the only plausible option. There is a
model of joint representation that has been applied often to large
groups -- the class action. Classes can number in the thousands.
Although procedure makes adjustments to take account of the large
numbers and the distance of the lawyer from most of her clients, in
general, it applies the conflict-of-interest, confidentiality, and
fiduciary norms associated with joint representation, rather than
those associated with organizational representation.10 Lawyers
cannot continue to represent an entire class once conflict develops
among its members; confidentiality does not limit the lawyer's
ability to disclose material information material to members of a
class, and lawyers have affirmative fiduciary duties to individual
class members.
Another explanation for differential treatment of joint and
organizational representation is implied consent. By formally
associating themselves in an organization, such as a corporation,
constituents indicate that they desire and expect to submerge their
individual interests in an entity.
Legal representation in
accordance with the entity model is one of the entailments of
formal organization that constituents embrace when they organize
formally. But this explanation, too, has deficiencies.
It misapprehends the psychological reality of, at least,
many small business organizations.
Legally, incorporation
typically occurs through the filing of papers that most constituents
may not even be aware of.
More than likely they think of
incorporation primarily as a means of limiting liability, and they
may not think of it as affecting internal relationships at all.
Constituents who deal directly with business counsel may think of
10

See generally, Deborah L. Rhode, "Class Conflicts in Class Actions,"
34 Stanford Law Review 1183 (1982).
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him as "their" lawyer in precisely the way that jointly represented
individuals do. Such concerns have led several courts in suits
between constituents of close corporation constituents to apply
partnership norms of mutual fiduciary duty. Cases like Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home11 ignore corporate formality in defining
internal duties among constituents and hold them to strong duties
of loyalty to each other as individual collaborators.
Another problem with the consent rationale is the formal
consent, the only kind of consent that can be presumed in the
organizational context, is emphatically not sufficient for joint
representataion under established doctrine. Joint representation
requires "informed" consent, which connotes both explicit
individual
manifestation
of
agreement
and
genuine
understanding.12 Even an explicit consent given after considerable
advice may be held insufficient if it later appears that an important
contingency was not foreseen. Yet, the implied constituent
consent that suffices for organizational representation does not
require either individual assent or understanding.
B. Piercing the Veil for Professional Responsibility
Purposes
One possible response to the doctrinal mystery we've just
considered is to deny that organizational representation should be
treated differently from joint representation. A few cases treat
corporate representation as tantamount to joint representation.13
11

370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7. Even informed consent is not
sufficient. The Rules require, in addition, that the lawyer reasonably determine
that joint representation will not adversely affect either clients' interests. The
contrast to organizational representation is striking. Once constituents acquire
the status of an organization, the Rules become silent about the lawyer's
responsibility for constituent understanding or welfare.
13
The practical concerns on which these cases are based are similar to
those cited by cases like Wilkes for treating close corporate constituents like
partners for the purposes of fiduciary duties among themselves. However,
doctrinally, it doesn't follow from the fact that an enterprise is treated as a
12
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In some cases, the issue is whether corporate counsel is
disqualified from a representation adverse to a constituent of the
corporation.
In Woods v. Superior Court, counsel for a
corporation wholly owned by a husband and wife was disqualified
from representing the husband in a divorce action against the wife.
The Court treated the wife as effectively a current client: "[I]n
representing an ongoing family corporation, Mr. Krolawec in a
very real sense continues to represent the wife."14 Two Oregon
cases arising from control contests in family corporations reach
similar results. "[T]he attorney in such a situation represents the
corporate owners in their individual capacities as well as the
corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made," one
concludes.15 And in a case disqualifying corporate counsel from
appearing in an action between its only two shareholders, the
Southern District of New York wrote that "it is indeed reasonable
for each shareholder to believe that corporate counsel is in effect
his own individual attorney."16
Sometimes the issue is whether those in control of the
corporation can invoke attorney-client privilege to prevent
interrogation of corporate counsel in litigation with a constituent.
In another husband-wife corporation case, a California court held
the privilege inapplicable. The court characterized the entity as
"akin to a partnership in informality."17
partnership for any or all purposes that the duties of counsel should be those
associated with joint representation. Partnerships are considered "entities" for
most purposes, and the lawyer's duties in the partnership context are no clearer
than they are in the corporate context. See below
14
Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Cal. App. 1983).
15
In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Ore. 1979); In Re Banks 584
P.2d 284 (Ore. 1978); see also Detter v. Schreiber, 16 ABA/BNA Lawyer's
Manual on Professional Conduct 228-29 (May 24, 2000).
16
Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The
joint representation approach is more commonly, though not consistently,
applied to partnerships. See below
17
Hecht v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. App. 1987).
Although, as we will see, there is some ambiguity about the organizational status
of a partnership, the court seems to be invoking the conception of partnership as
an "aggregate" of discrete individuals.
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In Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart18, the Delaware Chancellor
applied the joint representation approach where corporate counsel
took a business opportunity for himself at the expense of a
shareholder. The lawyer purchased the shares of two of the entity's
three shareholders, knowing that the third wanted to buy them.
Clearly, the lawyer's fiduciary duties to the corporation precluded
him from taking a "corporate opportunity" without consent, but the
court apparently considered that no interest of the corporation was
harmed by the lawyer's action. The court, nevertheless, held that
the lawyer owed a comparable duty to the individual shareholder.
It emphasized the informality of the business and characterized the
lawyer as "attorney for three joint venturers."
It is unclear to what extent these cases depend on personal
contact between constituents and lawyer. To the extent they do,
Skarbrevik might be distinguishable since there is no indication
that the lawyer defendant there had had direct contact with the
plaintiff. On the other hand, it is equally arguable that the joint
representation treatment in these cases is grounded, less on
personal contact between lawyer and constituents, than on the
nature of the businesses, especially, on the small numbers of
stakeholders and their informal relations with each other. These
are the factors on which the Wilkes line of cases bases its
imputation of fiduciary duties among constituents, and they would
seem equally relevant to the question of attorney-constituent
duties.
As the Wilkes cases emphasize, in small internally conduct
businesses, small business constituents do not have much sense of
A contrary approach was taken in Hoiles v. Superior Court, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 111 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1984) where the court applied the corporate
attorney-client privilege to bar a minority shareholder suing derivatively from
discovering attorney-officer communications, even though the corporation was
entirely owned and informally run by a small number of family members. The
case seems especially implausible because the corporate attorney had
represented some constituents in purely individual matters, and many of the
allegedly privileged communications involved non-shareholder family members.
18

40 Del. Ch. 316, 181 A.2d 579 (1962).
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a distinction between individual interests in the business and
corporate interests (and few lawyers would be able to give them a
coherent explanation of the distinction).19 More than likely, they
view incorporation as a source of limited liability and perhaps tax
advantage, rather than as a means of organizing their dealings with
each other. Probably each will have some sense of the danger of
conflict, but they are more likely to view the lawyer as someone
who, in such situations, will take an active role in trying resolve
the problem on terms that are fair to everyone. They are likely to
feel betrayed if the lawyer sides with other constituents against
them.20
C. Intermediate Responses to Small Corporation Disputes
Some alternative approaches that reduce the distinction
between joint and organizational representation have been
suggested.
i. "Reasonable expectations" and Additional Representation
Even in large corporations, where the corporate attorney
leads a constituent to believe that she is acting as the constituent's
19

Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at
; see also In Re Banks 584 P. 2d at 292 (in
these situations, "there is no reason for [a constituent] to differentiate in his mind
between his own and corporate interests").
20
The logic of cases such as Wilkes and Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), imputing fiduciary duties among
close corporation participants supports the joint representation approach for
lawyer duties to constituents, but as far as the cases are concerned, constituent
duties inter se do not necessarily entail lawyer-constituent duties. For example,
in all jurisdictions, general partners owe fiduciary duties to their partners, but
some courts have held that partnership lawyers owe no duties to individual
partners. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E. 2d 1280 (Ind. 1996); Richter v. Van Amberg
97 F. Supp.2d 1255 (D.N.M. 2000)
While cases applying the joint
representation approach to close corporations tend explain their results by
describing the business as "akin to a partnership", Hecht,
, at
least one case applying the "entity" approach to a partnership explains its result
by saying that partnerships are "analogous" to corporations. Rice v. Strunk 632
N.E. 2d 1151, 1152 (Ind. App. 3d Dist. 1994).
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individual lawyer, the courts will impose professional
responsibilities to the constituent. In one well known case, for
example, corporate counsel accompanied an officer to an SEC
hearing and said nothing when the officer identified him as his
personal lawyer. When the corporation subsequently sued the
officer over the same matter, the court treated the officer as a
former client and disqualified the lawyer from appearing for the
corporation.21
These cases do not, as the "piercing" ones do, speak of joint
constituent representation as corporate representation. Rather they
speak of constituent representation in addition to corporate
representation. The cases are a plausible response to two special
situations -- where the corporation agrees to provide representation
to a constituent and where corporate counsel carelessly leads a
constituent to misunderstand the limits of the lawyer's undertaking.
In the former case, the constituent duty arises from the agreement;
in the latter, it arises from the lawyer's carelessness, which is
attributable to the organization as the lawyer's principal.
However, this doctrine has also been interpreted more
broadly as a general approach to the issue of constituent duties in
organizational representation. Under this approach, whether the
organization's lawyer owes duties to a constituent depends solely
on the "reasonable expectations" of the constituent based on the
constituent's dealings with the lawyer (or perhaps other agents of
the organization). Some opinions involving partnerships and trade
associations could be read to take a view like this, and one
commentator has suggested that this doctrine should be applied to
organizations generally.22
21

E.F. Hutton v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.Tex. 1969); see also
Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal. App. 1956).
22
E.g., ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Opinion No. 91-361 (July 12, 1991) (partnership lawyer
does not "represent" individual partners for conflicts purposes unless factors
such as "partner's expectations of personal representation" indicate additional
undertaking); Security Bank v. Klicker, 142 Wis.2d 289, 418 N.W.2d 27, (Wis.
App. 1987) (partnership lawyer owed no duty to individual partner where no
evidence he "believed that Klicker represented him individually"); ABA
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The "reasonable expectations" approach would support
constituent duties only in a limited range of situations. First, it
depends on direct reliance-inducing conduct by the lawyer. The
constituents in Skarbrevik or our Freeze-Out hypothetical would
have no claim if they had not dealt personally with corporate
counsel.
Second, it would tend to deny constituent duties in
situations of manifest intra-organizational conflict.
The
requirement that the "expectations" be "reasonable" will be most
readily established in situations where conflict is either not
perceived or seems remote at the time the expectations are formed.
Where conflict is clear and strong at the outset, it seems likely that
the constituent's expectations will be held unreasonable. (Consider
a version of the Founder Freeze-Out in which the Founder first
encounters the lawyer after Investor-dominated board is seeking
his removal.) Doctrine generally declines to base duties on a
plaintiff's reliance on someone whose interests are manifestly
"adverse" to hers.23 Thus, a proponent of the "expectations
approach to client identity" argues that the minority shareholder in
Felty v. Hartwig, one of the freeze-out cases resembling our
hypothetical, could not reasonably have expected assistance from
corporate counsel because his interests were "adverse to the
corporation."24
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 92365 (July 6, 1992) (applying something like the "reasonable expectations
approach to whether a trade association lawyer owes duty to members); Note,
"An Expectations Approach to Client Identity," 106 Harvard Law Review 687
(1993) (generalizing expectations approach as a response to questions of
constituent duty). Further pertinent authority is reviewed and discussed in
Nancy J. Moore, "Expanding Duties of Attorneys to 'Non-Clients':
Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation
and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations," 45 South Carolina Law Review
659, 687-95 (1994)..
23
See, e.g., Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 750 P.2d
118 (N.M 1988) (reliance on statement of opposing party in litigation not
reasonable).
24
"Expectations Approach," cited in note 22, at
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However, since to offers no understanding of the interests
of the organization, the “expectations” approach yields no
explanation for either of these limitations.
Without some
understanding of the organization's interests, we have no basis for
rejecting the claim of the constituent who had no expectation of
individual representation but who claims that the lawyer's duty to
the organization required the lawyer to protect some interest of his.
Similarly, without some understanding of what the organization's
interests are, there is no way to make a judgment as to whether the
constituent's interests are "adverse." and hence whether the
expectations are "reasonable.25
The expectations approach is thus either incomplete or
implausible. It is incomplete to the extent it only purports to
address the question of whether the lawyer owes duties to the
constituent in addition to the organization but leaves unanswered
whether she owes duties to the constituent by virtue of her duties to
the organization. The approach is implausible to the extent it
incorporates the tacit identification of organizational and
managerial interests of cases such as Skarbrevik.
b. Aiding and Abetting Liability.
Some cases have held that a lawyer who assists
management in conduct that breaches managers' fiduciary duties to
constituents is liable to the constituents for "aiding and abetting"
the management breach.26 For example, the Oregon Supreme
25

There are similar problems with the claim that corporate counsel owes
a duty to constituents because constituents are "third-party beneficiaries" of the
contract to provide legal services to the organization. Where the corporation
contracts explicitly for counsel to provide legal services to constituents, there is
no reason not to enforce the contract. E.g., Kelly, Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman &
Maycock 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19742, at 7 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished).
However, courts routinely refuse to imply third-party beneficiary status merely
from the claimants status as a corporate constituent on the ground that the
corporation's purposes are too ambiguous. E.g., Skarbrevik
, at
26
Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999); see also Thornton v.
Evans, 692 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1064, 1082 (7th Cir. 1982) (attorney who
prepared documents facilitating fraudulent fund transfer liable for aiding and
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Court in Granewich v. Harding approved an aiding and abetting
theory on allegations of a wrongful freeze-out resembling those in
Skarbrevik. One of three principals in a close corporation alleged
that the other two breached fiduciary duties in diluting his
ownership through share issuances to themselves, removing him
without cause from the board, and terminating his employment
without cause. The Court indicated that corporate counsel could
by liable both for providing strategic advice to the two manager
defendants and for failing to inform the plaintiff of their activities.
As far as it goes, this approach seems strongly supported.
Longstanding tort principles prescribe liability for one who
knowingly provides substantial support to another's breach of a tort
duty.27 There is no reason to exclude lawyer duties from the reach
of this principle. The objection that fiduciary duty is often unclear
can be met by interpreting the requirement that the support be
provided "knowingly" to entail that the primary actor's breach be a
clear one. Skarbrevik and Granewich are examples; the courts
treated the managers' conduct in both cases as obvious breaches.
Lawyer liability to nonclients for assisting client fraud has
occasionally been resisted on the ground it might interfere with the
client trust and willingness to confide.28 The argument seems both
parochial and obtuse even where the person who invokes it is a
stranger. Doubtless every profession likes to believe that its
distinctive purposes are so important that its members should be
exempt from ordinary tort duties, but such claims should be
viewed with skepticism when they come from within the
profession in question. Moreover, in order to do their jobs,
lawyers require, not just the confidence of their clients, but the
willingness of others to trust them not to lie or take lawless
abetting breach of fiduciary duty under federal labor law). Contra, Weingarten
v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Illinois has never
recognized the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty").
27
Restatement (Second) of Torts sec.876(b); Restatement (Second) of
Agency sec. 348.
28
E.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 936 (1992).
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advantage. Otherwise, they would be unable to make credible
representations and commitments on behalf of their clients.
Howevermuch we credit arguments for lawyer exemption in the
third party context, they are irrelevant or circular in our context,
where the question is not the relative importance of client loyalty,
but rather who embodies the client for the purposes of this loyalty.
Granewich seems right in imposing liability for aiding and
abetting, but it goes only part of the way toward answering our
questions. It is concerned with liability and does not directly
address confidentiality and disqualification issues. Moreover, it is
not clear that it speaks even to liability when the claim, like the one
in our hypothetical, alleges only passive nondisclosure rather than
active deception or facilitation. The "substantial assistance"
requirement of the established tort principle has often been
interpreted to require more than silence.29 (Skarbrevik is, again,
an easy case for liability on this point. It appears that the lawyer,
in addition to giving advice, was active in preparing and filing
fraudulent documents. 30) It is a general tort principle that silence
alone does not confer liability unless there is a particular duty to

29

See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (accountants who
gave passive professional advice did not "participate" in firm's fraudulent
activities for purposes of RICO liability).
Skarbrevik rejected aiding and abetting liability by invoking the
doctrine that liability for aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach arises only when
the defendant acted "for personal gain." cite ; see Doctors' Co. v. Superior
Court, 775 P.2d 508, 513 (1989). The holding is subject to criticism on two
grounds. The strongest rationale for it would be to protect good faith (but
mistaken) legal advice. However, the general requirement that the defendant
have "knowledge/scienter" that the primary actor's conduct is wrongful should
largely accomplish this purpose without inquiry into gain. Moreover, the
Skarbrevik lawyers were being compensated by hourly fees and were probably
acting in the hope of preserving a relation that would generate fees in the future.
This ought to constitute "personal gain." See Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F.
Supp. 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (receipt of fees from breaching trustee warrants
inference that lawyer acted for personal gain).
30
See Skarbrevik,
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speak.31 This simply raises anew the question we turned to the
doctrine in the hope of answering.
To the extent that the founder's claim against the lawyer in
our hypothetical rests on the latter's failure to report the
accountant's statement, it seems viable under the joint
representation approach, which gives the lawyer himself a
fiduciary duty to the founder, but not under an "aiding and
abetting" theory, which would require active assistance to
management wrongdoing.
c. Retroactively Imposing the Corporate Veil
Instead of extending the joint representation approach into
the traditional realm of organization, we could do the opposite. In
Jess v. Danforth, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took this route for
disqualification issues arising from representations involving
organizational formation. In that case, 23 participants in a business
asked the lawyer to incorporate the business and represent it. A
partner of the lawyer subsequently represented a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice suit against Dr. Danforth, one of the twentythree, who had become an officer in the corporation. The
defendant sought to disqualify the firm on the ground that Dr.
Danforth was either a present client, by virtue of his corporate
office, or a former client, as a member of the pre-incorporation
group. The court declined to depart from the conventional view
that being an officer of a corporate client does not make one a
client. It then broke new ground by applying the "entity rule"
retroactively to the pre-incorporation group, holding that a member
of a business group that seeks assistance in incorporation is not to
be treated as an individual client for conflicts purposes.32
31
32

E.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts 551.
Jess v. Danforth, 169 Wis. 2d 229, 485 N.W. 2d 63, (1992):
[W]here (1) a person retains a lawyer for the purpose of
organizing an entity and (2) the lawyer's involvement with that person
is directly related to that incorporation and (3) such entity is eventually
incorporated, the entity rule applies retroactively such that the lawyer's
pre-incorporation involvement with the person is deemed to be
representation of the entity, not the person.
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The holding seems appropriate to the facts of the case. The
group may have been too large and its dealings too formal to make
the joint representation approach appropriate. Moreover, it appears
that the malpractice claim arose from activities unrelated to the
business that the firm had represented; so even if Dr. Danforth had
been deemed a former client, there might have been no basis for
disqualification.33
On the other hand, the court's broad formulation, which
would ostensibly apply the retroactive entity rule even to intrabusiness disputes among constituents in smaller, more informal
organizations, seems dubious. The court apparently relies on the
fact that individuals seeking incorporation expect and desire to be
dealt with on a more formal basis. But, as we have noted, the
overwhelmingly salient reasons for small business incorporation
concern dealings with outsiders, such as liability protection or ease
of contracting or holding property. There is no reason to assume
that the consequences such individuals desire include a
transformation in their internal relationships.
No one has suggested applying the retroactive approach to
liability and confidentiality issues. There is an obvious difficulty
in doing so. Given the absence of an organizational structure at
this point, it would be hard to determine to whom among the
constituents the lawyer should be accountable for fiduciary
purposes and who should control the privilege. As noted above,
such obstacles aren't categorically preclusive. There might be a
discernible informal authority structure. However, informality
does increase the difficulty of applying an "entity" perspective.
Moreover, in the disqualification context involved in that
case, the approach seems either superfluous or unsatisfactory. It is
superfluous where the conflict arises between a constituent and
some third party. There the "substantial relation" test will usually
produce the same result whether or not the entity approach is used.
It is unsatisfactory where, as in the Founder Freeze-Out, the
33

Model Rule 1.9(a) (requirement of consent for representation adverse
to former client applies where matter is “the same or substantially related” to
substance of prior representation).

23

SIMON

dispute is between constituents. Applying the retroactive entity
approach in that situation yields an immediate clear answer only if
we conflate corporate interests with those of the current control
group, and I have argued that this is improper.34
C. Conclusion
Some may find the arguments for the joint representation
approach implausible. Moreover, the ones I've presented are not
applicable to large, impersonal businesses. To the extent that we
find the joint representation approach inadequate, we will be
inclined to consider the entity approach either as an alternative or a
supplement to joint representation. We have yet to see what the
entity approach involves. In fact, there is no single understanding
of the entity approach. There are at least three variations. An
adequate analysis of intracorporate conflicts needs to draw on all
three. Once formulated plausibly, the entity approach turns out to
34

Still another alternative is a proposal by Lawrence Mitchell,
“Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic
Ethic," 74 Cornell Law Review 466 (1989). Mitchell would treat "close
corporation" representation as joint representation of the shareholders, but he
would apply a strict conflict-of-interest rule that would require separate
representation in a broad range of cases.34 Under this rule, there could be no
joint (or entity) representation of constituents unless certain conditions reducing
the likelihood of conflict were satisfied. Either the shareholders must all have
inherited their shares from a single founder, or there must be a majority
shareholder and the articles must clearly define the rights of all share classes.
This seems far too strict. Having pointed out the arbitrariness of the
conventional distinction between joint and organizational representation,
Mitchell reintroduces it in a less expansive but equally arbitrary form. Outside
the organizational context, the bar's joint representation rules provide a good
deal of flexibility in taking account of the costs and benefits of joint
representation. A lawyer can jointly represent even interests in open conflict if
she gets informed consent and reasonably believes it's in the interests of the
parties. And it is often reasonable to so believe. In addition to reducing lawyer
fees, joint representation can often dampen conflict, by strengthening trust,
facilitating the exchange of information, and precluding bluffing and aggressive
posturing. Mitchell's rule would often preclude constituents from choosing this
option even when there is no actual or anticipated conflict among them.
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be considerably less different from the joint representation
approach than conventional rhetoric presumes.
III. Entity Representation I: The Organization as Control
Group
The first interpretation of entity representation conflates the
corporation with those who have de facto control of it and the
corporation's interests with the interests of the control group. The
control group will usually be the group of officer/inside directors
with whom the lawyer routinely deals.
The Control Group view gives definite answers to most of
the questions in the Founder Freeze-Out scenario. After Founder
has been squeezed out, Investor is in control. Its interests are thus
the corporation's interests. It is in Investor's interests for the
lawyer to defend against any claims Founder might make, so the
lawyer is not disqualified. It is against Investor's interests for
Founder to find out about the accountant's statements, so
confidentiality forbids disclosure. And the Investor-controlled
board can invoke the attorney-client privilege against Founder.35
Although few lawyers will recognize or embrace this model
as an explicit principle, we have seen that it is the tacit premise of
cases that hold the corporate lawyer violates no professional duty
in assisting managers in flagrantly ultra vires conduct that injures
noncontrolling shareholders or that management may invoke the
attorney-client privilege against a derivative plaintiff. When courts
characterize constituents alleging unlawful conduct on the part of

35

Prior to the time Investor becomes a shareholder, Founder has control.
At this point, it is in Founder's interests for the lawyer to discuss the future
dangers of a squeeze-out, so lawyer should do this.
I have heard lawyers suggest it is not in the corporation's interest for
Founder to get this advice, even when he is the only officer/shareholder. They
appear to be anticipating Investor's control, or including them as informal
constituents prior to their stock acquisition. This seems implausible.
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the Control Group as "adverse" to the corporation, they are
conflating the corporation with incumbent management.36
A case that comes close to explicit espousal of the Control
Group model is Bell v. Clark, in which the Indiana Supreme Court
held that a lawyer for a limited partnership had no duty to inform
limited partners of wrongdoing by the general partner. The court
held that a partnership lawyer is answerable only to the partners
who have managerial authority:
To the extent that a partnership agreement places
responsibility for the management of the partnership in the
hands of less than all of the partners, the partners to whom
management authority has been given become the 'duly
authorized constituents' [entitled to instruct the lawyer].37
Since both the agreement and the statute gave managerial
responsibility to the general partner, the lawyer was answerable
only to him. The opinion is indifferent to the fact that the general
partner allegedly violated limitations on his conduct imposed by
both the agreement and the statute. Its use of the word
"authorized" is thus a term of art. Holding office, rather than
authority, constitutes the organization in this view.
This view is grounded in powerful psychological forces.
An organizational lawyer can only deal with her client through
agents. If she has recurring dealings with particular agents, she is
likely to develop personal relations with them. In contrast to these
relations, the client as an "entity" remains a remote and ambiguous
abstraction. Other corporate constituents are faceless and silent.
Relations with particular managers will be the most concrete,
vivid, and emotionally engaging dimension of the lawyer's work

36

E.g., Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 637 (the plaintiff was a "potential
adverse party whose interests could not be, and were not, represented by his
adversaries' chosen counsel [i.e., corporate counsel], whose duty of loyalty was
to his own client [sic]); Felty, 523 N.E.2d at 557.
37
Bell v. Clark, 670 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind. 1996).
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for the client. There is probably a natural psychological tendency
to identify the client with these personal relations.
This psychological disposition will be reinforced by other
factors. If the managers are senior officers, they will have broad
authority over corporate affairs, so the psychological identification
will overlaps the legal one substantially. More than likely, these
officers will have chosen to employ the lawyer and will make
decisions about lawyers future employment; so self-interest
encourages the lawyer to identify them as the entity. And finally,
professional responsibility rhetoric tends to speak of clients as
persons and, even when it distinguishes organizational clients, to
speak of them as unitary entities, thus encouraging the overlooking
of conflict.
This tendency is also reinforced by the fact that
personifying the corporation in terms of its agents is a useful
cognitive and legal device across a broad range of situations. These
are situations in which the lawyers assist managers in dealing on
behalf of the corporation with outsiders. In these situations, the
legal fiction that treats the corporation as a unified, organic entity
rests in part on the shared interest of its constituents in enhancing
its value. There is good reason to presume in this situation that
those in control will act in good faith on behalf of this interest. To
be sure, there may be differences among constituents about the
best way to pursue their shared interest, and some constituents may
sometimes have unshared interests that may bias their judgments,
but where there is no manifest disagreement and no apparent
conflict of interest, it is reasonable to presume that those in control
are serving the shared interest. The same considerations that
underpin the "business judgment rule" which prescribes deference
to disinterested managerial judgments in derivative suits, supports
the lawyer's tendency to identify the corporation with management
in considering her professional responsibilities.
However, the grounds for the identification erode when the
managers are dealing, not with an outsider on behalf of an
ostensibly unified group of constituents, but with or on behalf of

27

SIMON

insiders in situations of conflict. Managerial self-interest is less
likely here to coincide with legitimate constituent interests.
In the intracorporate situation, the Control Group
perspective is subject to the obvious objection that it confuses
power with right. It is unreasonable to view the interests of those
with de facto control as those of the corporation without regard to
how they attained control or how they are using it. The approach
resembles those versions of Legal Positivism that identify law with
the pronouncements a Sovereign, a view that H. L. A. Hart
conceded would make law indistinguishable from the commands
of a well-armed thug.38
Decisions in conflict cases that invoke the Control Group
principle are often either insupportable (like Skarbrevik) or
supportable only on some other principle (like the Authority
Structure principle to be considered momentarily).
There may, however, be a range of situations involving
conflict where something like the Control Group principle could
survive analysis. Perhaps the most important candidates involve
control contests in public corporations. -- either proxy battles or
takeovers through stock purchases. Corporate counsel routinely
assist managers in fighting proxy challenges and hostile takeovers.
It seems to be taken for granted that such practice serves corporate
interests.39 It is just as commonly assumed that it would be
improper for corporate counsel to assist the challenger, even if she
felt that the corporation would be better off if the challenge
succeeded.40 These assumptions are debatable. In all such
38

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 20-25 (1960).
For a rare explicit discussion, see ABA Informal Opinion 1056 (1968)
which approves assisting management in a proxy contest, but then adds the
familiar question-begging qualification "except in situations where … the giving
of the advice would be adverse to the interests of the corporation."
40
Compare Financial General Bankshares v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744
(D.D.C. 1981), rev'd for lack of jurisdiction, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C.Cir. 1982)
(corporate counsel breached duty by collaborating with dissident shareholders:
"…Metzger's duty of undivided loyalty to his client corporation should have
been directed toward the advancement of the goals articulated by Middendorf as
the incumbent manager"). with In re Wise, 433 Mass. 80, (2000) (approving
39
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situations, the challengers assert that the corporation would be
better off if the management were defeated. (Or if counsel is
assisting management in defending against an anticipated future
challenge -- for example, by installing anti-takeover defenses,
management has a strong conflict of interest that raises questions
about its ability to speak, even without contradiction, for the
corporation.) To be sure, counsel will rarely be in a position to
make a reliable judgment on the merits. That limitation, however,
does not necessarily suggest commitment to management as a
default position. As a matter of logic, it would seem to lead more
directly to neutrality.
Perhaps the pro-management default position might be
grounded on a corporate law presumption that continuity of
management serves corporate interests. One might infer such a
presumption from numerous features that advantage incumbents,
including privileged access to relevant information, discretion over
voting procedures, the ability to finance proxy campaigns from the
corporate treasury, and the constraints in securities, banking and
insurance law on large shareholder activism.
Moreover, it's not clear that any purpose would be served
by requiring corporate counsel to remain passive in these
situations. Management would then have to retain its own counsel
to whom it would have to provide, at additional expense, all the
information already possessed by corporate counsel relevant to the
issues. It is also not clear what role would remain for corporate
counsel.41
discipline of nonprofit corporation lawyer who assistant dissidents; describing
duty as “to remain neutral”). See also ABA Informal Opinion 516 (1962)
(corporate counsel may not assist dissident shareholders, even if he believes
their success would be in the best interests of the corporation).
41

[Requiring separate counsel for management in all situations of
conflict] is both unrealistic and wasteful: unrealistic because it ignores
the close working relationship between the in-house attorney and
management, and wasteful because it relegates the corporate attorney to
a passive or duplicative role in conflicts where no separate "entity
interests" are identifiable.
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The pro-management policy has limits, however. If a
presumption is warranted, it has to be a rebuttable one. First, it is
routinely conceded that where management is pursuing a course
that is plainly unlawful counsel must not assist.42 This is not a
demanding standard in the control contest area, however, where
standards are vague and management has a good deal of discretion.
Second, substantial authority requires that corporate
counsel remain neutral in some derivative suits. Where the
individual defendants include incumbent officers, joint
representation is deemed permissible in early stages, while the
nature of the claims is explored, or where the claims seem patently
without merit. In other situations, however, courts have insisted on
separate representation. Some have permitted corporate counsel to
represent the officers, while new counsel is retained for the
corporation. Others have insisted that corporate counsel represent
the corporation, while new counsel is retained for the officers.43
There are efficiencies to having corporate counsel assist
management in all internal disputes. Counsel is already familiar
with the issues and has an established line of communication with
management. But the principle of loyalty to the entity is deemed
to require the sacrifice of these efficiencies in the derivative
context.
What differentiates many proxy or acquisition contests
from derivative suits is that the former necessarily involves a
specific allegation of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
management. Where such an allegation is not patently without
merit, it suffices to overcome the pro-management presumption.
Of course, control contests often involve allegations of
breach of fiduciary duty, and are often accompanied by derivative
suits. Moreover, even where such allegations have not been made,
"Developments in the Law- Conflicts of Interest," 94 Harvard Law
Review 1244, 1335 (1981).
42
E.g., id., at 1337-38.
43
E.g., Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C.Cir.
1971). See the further discussion of representation in derivative suits at
below.

30

ORGANIZATIONAL LAWYERING

there may be other grounds for considering the presumption
rebutted. If management is engaging in a clear breach of duty, the
lawyer should not be permitted to wait for a derivative suit to
challenge it before taking responsive action.
A harder case arises in situations like the Founder FreezeOut where the breach is not clear, there has been no constituent
claim, but there probably would be if material information were
available to an affected constituent. If the Founder knew the
accountant's statement, he would be likely to make a claim. If the
claim would be nonfrivolous, it might be desirable from the point
of view of the organization as a whole for it to be asserted, since
this would trigger a more reliable process for the resolution of the
issue than will otherwise occur. Current management has a strong
and specific conflict-of-interest here, so it makes no sense to
accord them the benefit of any presumption.
Some kind of pro-Control Group presumption may help
explain why corporate counsel has broad latitude to assist
incumbent management in control disputes, but the presumption is
only plausible if subject to strong limits. Those limits will have to
be supplied by principles of authority and fiduciary duty. These
are the basis of the second and third interpretations of the entity
idea. Once they have been elaborated, there will be little
remaining use for the Control Group as a distinct interpretation of
entity representation.
IV. Entity Representation II: The Organization as Authority
Structure
The second perspective equates the corporation with its
authority structure. One way in which a formal organization
differs from a collection of individuals is that its constituents have
adopted arrangements for allocating power and making decisions.
Thus, we could say that the lawyer's duty is to this structure.
A. Model Rule 1.13
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ABA Model Rule 1.13 seems to enact the Authority
Structure perspective in providing, "A lawyer employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its
duly authorized constituents."44 Control is not enough; authority is
the touchstone.
The Rule, however, fails to develop this idea coherently or
plausibly.
After asserting the general Authority Structure
principle, it proceeds to an elaboration that bespeaks confusion and
ambivalence. These paragraphs deal with situations in which a
corporate agent engages in conduct that is a "violation of law" and
is "likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." They
offer some vague platitudes about acting in the "best interests of
the corporation", then suggest that the lawyer "may" go over the
agent's head to the "highest authority that can act in behalf of the
organization," and conclude that if the "highest authority" behaves
unlawfully, the lawyer "may" resign.
This formulation has some salient deficiencies:
First, one would think that it would always be in the
organization's interests for the lawyer to report to an agent's
superiors "unlawful" conduct likely to inflict "substantial injury"
on the organization, where the agent persists after remonstrance by
the lawyer. If this would be in the corporation's interests, one
would think that the lawyer, on any interpretation of organizational
representation, would have a duty to do it. Yet, the rule speaks of
this only as something the lawyer "may" do.
Second, when the "highest authority" in the organization
insists on a "clearly" illegal and injurious course of action, the only
option under the Rule seems to be resignation.45 The Rule provides
this only in a roundabout way.
(Here, as elsewhere,
circumlocution signals ambivalence and dissensus within the bar.)
It doesn't specifically preclude further disclosure; it simply says
that the lawyer "may withdraw." Nevertheless, when the rule is
44

Emphasis added.
And again, it's merely an option, not a duty. But see Model Rule
1.16(a)(1) (lawyer "shall withdraw" if the representation will result in a violation
of law).
45
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glossed in the light of its legislative history and the related
confidentiality rule, the most likely inference is that the lawyer
may not do anything else; in particular, she may not make
disclosures to corporate constituents other than the "highest
authority" or to public authorities. 46
The disclosure limitation seems inconsistent with the
general Authority Structure principle with which the rule begins.
That principle holds that the lawyer represents the organization
acting through its "duly authorized" constituents. Even the
"highest authority", when it engages in an injurious and "clearly"
illegal course of conduct, is not "duly authorized." If it lacks
authority to engage in the conduct, then it lacks authority to
instruct the lawyer to remain passive about it. Thus, the lawyer
cannot look to the "highest authority" to express the corporation's
interests. On what basis then do the Rules assume that passivity
would be in the corporation's interests? The drafters are silent on
this point.
B. Beyond the Board?
46

The drafters of the Model Rules proposed initially to permit whatever
disclosure was required by the best interests of the organization, but the House
of Delegates rejected this proposal. See Stephen Gillers, "Model Rule 1.13(c)
Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure," 1
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 289 (1987). Four states - Maryland,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and New Jersey - have enacted versions of the rule
with disclosure permission resembling the initial draft. Stephen Gillers and Roy
D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 1998 145. The
dominant view among practitioners and commentators seems to be that under
the official draft disclosure is not permitted beyond the Board. Robert Tuttle,
"The Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation", 1994
University of Illinois Law Review 889, 924-25 and materials cited at note 190.
But there have been dissents. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and William Hodes,
The Law of Lawyering 17-14-16 (3d ed. 2001) (suggesting that close
corporation counsel might be warranted in disclosing control group wrongdoing
to shareholder); Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers sec. 96, comment f,
at v. II, p. 44 ("view of the Reporters [is that the Rule] should not be understood
to preclude controlled [outside] disclosure where … disclosure would clearly be
in the interest of the entity client.").
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A further issue concerns the interpretation of "highest
authority." In corporations, this is usually the board. Many
lawyers tend to conflate the authority structure with the board and
operate on the general principle that, when they encounter intracorporate conflict, they should look to the board for instruction.
This can be a useful presumption, but it is not valid categorically.
As the Comments to the Rule acknowledge, "applicable law may
prescribe that under certain conditions highest authority reposes
elsewhere."
They mention as an example that special
responsibility for some corporate decisions is conferred on
independent directors.
Curiously, the Comments don't mention shareholders,
although they have responsibility for some important decisions.
(In nonprofit corporations, the attorney general and sometimes
members have analogous roles; with trusts, the court sometimes
must make or approve critical decisions.) The question thus arises
whether the "highest authority" should include shareholders when
the relevant course of conduct could only be authorized by
shareholders.
Skarbrevik is an example. The Articles amendment
eliminating pre-emptive rights required shareholder approval. The
defendants were seeking to avoid this procedure. Shareholders
could waive a meeting but only with notice and unanimous
consent. Thus, the Authority Structure principle suggests that the
lawyer should have looked to the body of shareholders to
determine the corporation's interests, and as a practical matter, this
required informing the fourth shareholder of the situation. This
would be the best way to respect the role of shareholders, and
notwithstanding the court's characterization of him as "adverse" to
the corporation, there is no competing legitimate interest that
would have been jeopardized by doing so.
We might thus elaborate the Authority Structure principle
by suggesting that, where no one with authority is available to
instruct the lawyer, her job is to facilitate the processes of
authoritative decision. This would usually entail providing
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information to key participants that is likely to prompt them to
trigger the relevant processes.
This approach would be more difficult to apply with larger
corporations. Here, informing shareholders would often be
tantamount to making information public, and there might be
corporate interests that would weigh against this. (Perhaps the
information would trigger government prosecution or damage suits
by private outsiders, or perhaps it would give some advantage to
competitors.) Yet, even with public corporations, going to
shareholders may be an appropriate option.
SEC v. National Student Marketing, a case interpreting
lawyer duties to their clients under the securities laws, illustrates
the application of the Authority Structure perspective in a public
corporation context. National Student Marketing and Interstate
National, two public companies, agreed to a merger in which
Interstate shareholders would exchange their shares for National
Student Marketing shares. At the closing, the lawyers discovered
that the "comfort letter" from NSM's accountants required by the
merger agreement would be qualified by adjustments to the
earnings figures disclosed to the Interstate shareholders in
connection with the shareholder vote to approve the merger. The
lawyers informed the Board, and the "consensus of the directors
was that there was no need to delay the closing."
The Court held that the Board was mistaken and that the
lawyers violated the antifraud norms of the securities law by
proceeding with the closing. The lawyers should have insisted that
proxies be re-solicited with disclosure of the new information: "In
view of the obvious materiality of the information ... the attorneys'
responsibilities to their corporate client required them to take steps
to ensure that the information would be disclosed to
shareholders."47 The court thus adopts the Authority Structure
47

457 F. Supp. 652,
(D.D.C. 1978).
The fact that shareholder claims under the securities acts are termed
"direct" rights of shareholders, while most state law fiduciary duty claims are
termed "derivative" rights of the corporation should not distinguish National
Student Marketing from cases like the Founder Freeze-Out scenario. The line
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perspective, but unlike Model Rule 1.13, recognizes that with
respect to matters requiring shareholder decision, it may entail
duties to go beyond the board.
C. Limits of the Authority Structure Perspective
In a case like Skarbrevik, where the lawyer participates in
violation of a specific rule allocating authority, the application of
the Authority Structure perspective is fairly straightforward.
However, many situations are more ambiguous, not only because
authority norms can be ambiguous, but because the distinction
between authority norms and other kinds of norms may not be
clear. Indeed, any decision by a corporate manager that violates
any norm might be called unauthorized.
To cabin the Authority Structure approach, we might focus
on procedural, as opposed to substantive, norms. The distinction is
often readily intelligible. Rules that say that say that pre-emptive
rights can only be eliminated through Articles amendment and that
Articles amendment requires a shareholder vote definitely sound
procedural. Moreover, a major strategy of corporate law is to rely
on procedural norms to avoid judicial resolution of difficult
substantive decisions. Most important internal substantive norms
are subsumed under the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The
"business judgment" rule focuses duty-of-care review on
considerations such as the extent of efforts to seek information and
of deliberation. The ratification statutes focus duty-of-loyalty
review on disclosure to and ratification by disinterested directors.
Both tend to turn substantive issues into procedural ones. The
Authority Structure approach to professional responsibility seems
between direct and derivative shareholder actions has been drawn largely for
procedural purposes and is arbitrary and anachronistic even within that sphere.
There is no reason to interpret the common law and the securities statutes to
ascribe different substantive concepts of corporate obligation. The courts
usually interpret the two bodies as in pari materia. E.g., Dirks v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646,
(1983). Note that in enforcing the
securities acts the NSM court speaks of the defendants' duty to "their corporate
client."
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consistent with the strategy of judicial control that focuses on
procedural regularity.
Nevertheless, this approach will be hard to apply to the
extent that the intracorporate dispute is about authority. This is
explicitly the case in the Founder Freeze-Out story. The issue is
whether Investor is entitled to control the board. That, of course,
depends on the merits of Investor's claim that the milestones have
not been met. To assume that the current board has authority to
instruct the lawyer is to assume Investor's position on the merits.
Of course, if the lawyer were to disclose the accountant's
statements to Founder, Founder would be likely to raise the
substantive issue in a lawsuit.
Litigation is a default
decisionmaking procedure when the normal corporate processes
fail to achieve agreement. If we viewed shareholder litigation as
an extension of the corporate processes, we might conclude that
the Authority Structure would support disclosure to Founder. To
decide that disclosure is warranted, the lawyer does not need to
decide that Founder's claim is meritorious, simply that disclosure
will enhance the decisionmaking process.
Some may find it implausible, as a formal matter, to see
litigation as a kind of intra-corporate process.
Moreover,
functionally, it may be naive to assume that litigation oriented
toward the resolution of authority disputes is always in the interests
of the corporation. Litigation is costly, and it often involves
pressures that are unrelated to the merits. If Founder would be
likely to lose the case after imposing substantial legal costs on the
corporation or if she would be likely to force a settlement for
reasons unrelated to the merits, it would not be in the corporation's
interests to trigger such a suit. Assessing such contingencies
requires some judgment on the merits. The question cannot be
answered purely in terms of procedural norms.
Moreover, even if we can somehow decide that the
corporation, understood as an Authority Structure, has an interest
in the litigation going forward, further issues arise as to the
conduct of the litigation. For example, can the corporation's
lawyer represent the Investor-nominated board members, either
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alone or with the corporation? If the joint representation
perspective is rejected, then Founder cannot claim to be a present
or former client, and there is no ground for disqualification on that
ground. On the other hand, the corporation has been a client, and
if joint representation with the directors is contemplated, will
continue to be. Thus, its consent is necessary. The question thus
arises as to how the corporation can consent in this circumstance.
The Control Group approach suggests that incumbent management
could consent on behalf of the corporation,48 but this implausibly
ignores management's conflict of interest
The Authority approach yields no better answer. The
Investor directors should not be understood to have authority to
make an important corporate decision when they have a severe
conflict. On the other hand, the only other constituent - Founder is equally conflicted. If no consent is possible, then the default
position is separate representation for Founder, Investor, and the
corporation. But this is would entail significant additional costs.
If Investor is right on the merits, then separate representation is
against the corporation's interests. Again, we cannot assess the
merits solely in terms of authority norms.
In general, cases where all or most of the board has a
serious conflict will pose difficulties under the Authority Structure
principle. The authority of a board in this situation is often
ambiguous. A decision by an interested board is usually voidable
on the complaint of shareholders unless either ratified by
shareholders after full disclosure or proven "fair".49 Suppose,
however, management does not seek ratification, and the
shareholders do not have enough information to complain. Is such
a decision "authorized"? The decision is not clearly unauthorized;
48

See California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion 1999-153 (board dominated by one
of two shareholders can consent to joint representation of dominant shareholder
and corporation in derivative suit by minority shareholder). But see also the
contrary authority cited in notes below.
49
See James D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen, and F. Hodge O'Neal,
Corporations 209-15 (1997)
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at least it is not per se ultra vires. Moreover, the statutes do not
require shareholder authorization; they simply make that one mode
of authorization. The transaction is also legitimate if it's "fair", but
here authority depends, not on procedures, but on the substantive
merits of the decision. It seems likely that in some situations of
this type it would be desirable for managers to make disclosures to
shareholders. The reasons for this, however, are not fully captured
by the Authority Structure idea.
If the Authority Structure perspective is ambiguous where
the dispute is about authority, it is incomplete in circumstances
where an act that seems procedurally authorized arguably violates
substantive rights. An important of cases involves constituents
without control rights. Minority shareholders, for example, often
lack both board representation and veto rights in a shareholder
vote. Nevertheless, they have a right to fair treatment by the
corporation and the board. Statutes sometimes provide mandatory
supplemental control rights to protect their interests, but it
sometimes happens that control rights are insufficient to protect
against certain types of exploitative decisions that violate
substantive fiduciary duties.50 A legal ethic focused on procedural
norms would not reach such decisions.
If nonshareholders are considered corporate constituents,
than some of their claims would also not be reached. Internal
control rights are presumptively accorded to shareholders, but
some argue that nonshareholder groups such as creditors or
workers or local communities should be considered corporate
constituencies to which substantive duties are owed. To the extent
that procedural norms do not provide control rights parallel to
these substantive ones, the Authority Structure approach does not
reach them.
A second category of cases to which the Authority
Structure approach seems unresponsive includes situations where
the lawyer deals with a constituent outside of the authority
50

E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Coggins
v. New England Patriots Football Club, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986); Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464 (1969).
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structure – the situation addressed in the Opdyke case mentioned
above and the federal insider trading rules.
V. Entity Representation III: The Organization as
Framework of Dealing
A. Introduction
The third understanding of entity representation identifies
the corporation with its entire legal framework, including in
addition to norms about authority, substantive norms. The
corporation derives its unity from a legal structure designed to
reconcile the interests of its constituents. The Authority Structure
is only part of the full legal structure. In particular, it omits much
of the range of fiduciary duties. Understood in terms of its full
legal structure, the corporation's identity includes, in addition to a
set of decisionmaking procedures, a commitment that its
constituents be treated fairly. Thus, a corporation has an interest in
the fair treatment of its constituents.
The Framework-of-Dealing approach overlaps the
Authority Structure one and will often lead to the same result.
Where a particular issue is clearly assigned to a particular
constituent or body within the corporation, both approaches
counsel deference to that constituent. But the Framework-ofDealing approach suggests that decisions sometimes turn on
substantive norms.
For example, in the Founder Freeze-Out scenario, the
lawyer might resolve the conflict-of-interest issue by aligning
himself with the constituent who had the more meritorious claim.
If the founder's claim is valid, the lawyer should represent him; if
not, he should continue to represent the incumbent board. His goal
in either case is to represent the corporation. He decides which
among the competing claimants speaks for the corporation by
determining which claim is most consistent with the Framework of
Dealing.
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Similar considerations might bear on confidentiality. If the
board's substantive position is consistent with the Framework of
Dealing, its claim to control the attorney-client privilege is strong.
If not, the attorney might feel obliged to make her own judgment
as to whether confidentiality is in the corporation's interest. And
the same point applies to fiduciary duties. The lawyers duties to
the corporation should extend to a constituent who has a claim well
grounded in the Framework of Dealing. If the founder's claim is
valid and disclosure of the accountant's statement to him will
facilitate its assertion, then this approach supports a duty to
disclose.
Of course, in many, perhaps even most, situations, the
lawyer will not be able to determine reliably the substantive merits.
In these circumstances, the Framework-of-Dealing approach
implies neutrality. With respect the conflict-of-interest issue, it
means that the lawyer cannot speak for any of the disputing
constituents. He must withdraw. This is the same result as the
Joint Representation approach, but the basis for it is different. In
the Joint Representation perspective, withdrawal is required
because the lawyer cannot adequately represent all individuals and
cannot represent any of them individually without jeopardizing
duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the others. In the
Framework-of-Dealing approach, withdrawal is required because
the client's interests cannot be determined.51 If the lawyer cannot
determine the organization's interests, then the premise of treating
its constituents as a unity is absent.
51

A California ethics committee opinion applies the joint representation
approach to a limited partnership riven by disputes. The two general partners
are giving inconsistent instructions to the lawyer, and the agreement does not
indicate how such deadlocks should be resolved. In addition, the limited
partners seek to remove one of the general partners, but the agreement gives
them the right to do so only on specified grounds, which they assert and the
general partner denies are present. The opinion recommends that the lawyer
withdraw.
California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion 1994-137, ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct.
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With respect to confidentiality, neutrality implies no
confidentiality as among constituents. If it is not apparent which
constituent speaks on behalf of the corporation, then none of them
are in a position to invoke confidentiality against the others. With
respect to fiduciary duties, neutrality implies no active duties to
constituents, including the board.
(Of course, duties of
confidentiality vis-à-vis outsiders, and fiduciary duties to protect
undisputed corporate interests would continue. Neutrality applies
only to the intracorporate dispute.)
The Framework-of-Dealing approach has a strong affinity
with Brandeis's notion of "counsel to the situation." Louis
Brandeis used this phrase to describe his intervention in the famous
Lennox case. The owner of a troubled tannery business and one of
its creditors consulted Brandeis, who already represented another
of the business's creditors. The owner insisted that he was
committed to repaying all creditors in full. The creditors
apparently wanted some assurance against asset stripping or further
encumbrances until the debts had been discharged. Brandeis
suggested that the business be assigned to one of his partners for
the benefit of creditors. His role would be "to give everybody, to
the best of my ability, a square deal" and "to see that everybody
got his legal rights." Owner and creditors agreed, but the
arrangement broke down when the owner refused to transfer some
property to the trustee and the two got into a dispute over the
owner's claims for compensation for assisting the trustee.52
In the resulting dispute, the owner accused Brandeis of
violating conflict-of-interest norms. Asked whom he represented,
Brandeis replied, "I should say that I was counsel for the
situation."53 The premise of this remark is precisely that of the
approach to organizational representation we are considering.
Brandeis's "situation" is a Framework of Dealing -- an immanent
structure of converging interests constituted by express, implied,
default, and mandatory legal terms. The idea has been much
52

See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life 232-37
(1956) (describing the Lennox case).
53
Id., at 236.
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derided as a basis for joint representation.54 Yet, no one objects to
corporate representation on the ground of constituent conflict, and
Brandeis's notion is the one that best explains how such
representation is possible in circumstances of conflict.
The Framework-of-Dealing perspective thus adopts the
best theoretical understanding of why the law speaks of the
organization as an entity. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that it has value as a practical guide to professional
responsibility decisions. Some will be disturbed by the notion that
the lawyer has responsibility for determining the merits of an
intracorporate dispute. Some will think the she will so seldom be
able to make such a judgment that the approach will require
neutrality with excessive frequency. In fact, however, something
like the Framework-of-Dealing approach seems already presumed
by current doctrine in a variety of situations, and it seems to be
workable in these and other situations.
We proceed to consider, first, the jurisprudential basis of
the Framework of Dealing approach, and then turn to its practical
application in current doctrine.
B. Jurisprudential Basis
1. The Framework of Dealing

54

Seven former presidents of the American Bar Association condemned
Brandeis's professional ethics in the proceedings on his Supreme Court
nomination, on the basis of several episodes, including the Lennox case. Id. at
489-90. Many contemporary lawyers agree with the criticism of his conduct in
this case. John Frank, for example, concludes a critical appraisal with the
advice, "never be 'counsel for a situation'", explaining, "Lawyers are not retained
by situations, and the adversary system assumes that they faithfully represent
one interest at a time." "The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis," 17 Stanford
Law Review 683, 708 (1965). But lawyers are retained by organizations, and
once we recognize that it is a Framework of Dealing that makes organizational
representation possible, we see that such grounding may also be available in
circumstances involving formally unaffiliated individuals. See below
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The Framework of Dealing approach has the virtue that it
provides the most plausible formulation of the connotations of the
"corporation", or more generally, "organization", as we
conventionally personify it in legal discourse.
The starting point should be the recognition that the
corporation is a legal fiction. It has no psychology of its own and
no moral status of its own. Thus, it cannot have interests of its
own. We use the fiction as convenient proxy for the interests of its
constituents. We may regard these constituent interests as forming
a whole that transcends its parts (an "entity" rather than an
"aggregate"), but it remains the case that a corporation's interests
are entirely dependent on those of its constituents.
Thus, it makes no sense to speak of corporate interests that
are unrelated or contrary to shared constituent interests. It is a
mistake, for example, to say, as courts have in distinguishing
between derivative and direct or representative claims, "actions to
compel the dissolution of a corporation [are] representative, since
the corporation could not possibly benefit therefrom."55 If a
corporation were a natural person, the analogy to dissolution would
be suicide, which one might plausibly think is never, or virtually
never, in a natural person's interest. But when we start to think this
way in the case of an organization, we have lost our moorings.
The only meaningful benefit a corporation can produce is for
people, and there are many situations in which the relevant people
might benefit from dissolution. It makes as much sense to speak of
a corporation benefiting from dissolution as it does to speak of a
corporation benefiting from a tax refund. In both cases, the
55

Fontheim v. Walker, 141 N.Y.S.2d 62,
(Sup. Cit. 1955); see also
Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983) (in a transaction between a threeshareholder corporation and its largest shareholder, corporate counsel's
responsibility is to protect corporation's "continued existence"). On the other
hand, some of the cases arising from the Savings and Loan crisis suggest
lawyers and managers breached duties by "artificial[ly] prolong[ing]" the lives
of their corporations. Schacht v. Brown. 711 F/2d 1343. 1348 (7th Cir. 1983);
In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 900 F. Supp. 784, 787 (W.D. Pa.
1995). None of these cases give any meaning to the concept of corporate
interests independent of the conclusions they invoke them to justify.
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corporation stands as a proxy for interests of its human
constituents.56
The second point is that, when we reify or personify the
corporation, it is usually to segregate a particular sub-class of the
interests associated with it. These are the interests associated with
ownership. In the business corporation, ownership claims are
associated with the provision of capital, but there may be other
bases through which ownership status is acquired (and in some
other organizational forms capital supply is rarely or never a basis
for ownership claims). The critical distinction -- the one that
motivates organizational personification -- is between residual
claims and ordinary contact claims. Ownership claims are
residual. Residual claims and ordinary contract claims can be
either for financial or control rights. In the business corporation,
residual financial claims tend to go with (but don't always coincide
with) residual control claims.
Residual claims tend to be less specified than ordinary
contract claims. Ordinary contract is more likely to specify a fixed
return or a defined performance or a set of particular protective
covenants. But the more important distinction is that residual
claims are secondary or "junior" to contract claims. This does not
mean that they are less important. It means that scope can be
defined only after ordinary contract duties have been delineated.
The residual rights apply to what is left over (control or economic
surplus) after ordinary contract claims have been given their due.
The personified corporation is a proxy for these residual
claims. We tend to speak of these residual claims as "fiduciary"
and to oppose them to "contract" claims. Residual claims by their
nature are harder to specify. Moreover, residual claims typically
56

To say that corporate "interests" are a function of constituent interests
does not necessarily imply either (a) that the only relevant constituent interests
are shareholder interests or (b) that all constituent interests are monetizable. In
the Time-Warner take-over case, for example, the Court gave weight to a public
and employee interest in Time's "corporate culture" of "journalistic integrity."
Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). The
argument here does not depend on any position on such issues.
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entail both greater risk and greater possibility of exceptional gain,
and both possibilities lead those who hold such claims to look for
greater trust in their collaborators than the law provides for arm's
length contract relations. Thus, fiduciary or residual claim duties
often require more initiative in pursuing shared ends, more
forbearance in pursuing selfish ends, and more candor than
ordinary contract duties.
Nevertheless, the contrast is to "ordinary contract", not to
contract tout court, because the duties associated with residual
claims and corporate personality are to an important extent
contractual. They depend in substantial part on agreement, and
they are discerned through the techniques of contractual
interpretation. However, the term "nexus of contracts" favored by
some economically-minded scholars of the corporation is not
helpful in describing the legal significance of corporate
personality. Not only is "nexus" a term without any conventional
legal meaning, but the term as a whole blurs the critical distinction
between the residual claim contract implied by corporate
personality and the other, more conventional contractual relations
in which the enterprise is involved.
2. The Importance of Distributive Norms
The residual claim contract that constitutes the corporation
as an entity is a Framework of Dealing. It consists of both
procedural and substantive norms. It includes specific negotiated
terms, implied agreed terms, and background default and
mandatory terms supplied by law. These terms appear in a variety
of sources, including Articles, By-Laws, contracts, statutes, and
cases.
One further distinction that can be made among the norms
of the Framework of Dealing is between allocative and distributive
norms. Allocative norms concern the pursuit of aggregate benefits.
The ultimate allocative norm is "maximize constituent welfare",
but there are a variety of subnorms that may specify the meaning
of such welfare ( e.g., short-term or long-term?) and the means that
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can be used to attain it (e.g., levels of risk, lines of business). The
other type of norm is distributive. Distributive norms specify how
control and financial benefits in the firm are divided among
constituents.
It is possible to think of the allocative interests of
constituents as converging on a continuing basis. As long as
distributive norms give each constituent some interests in the
corporation's net assets and income, all share an interest in
maximizing these assets and income.
Distributive norms,
however, may converge only ex ante. At the time the constituents
join together (or a later-arriving constituent joins an established
organization) the distributive norms make collaboration possible.
As the collaboration proceeds, a constituent will have an interest in
getting a larger share than she bargained for, but like ordinary
contracts, the organizational Framework of Dealing is designed
both to resolve conflict and preserve the integrity of the general
organizational structure by holding constituents to their distributive
commitments.
There is an unfortunate tendency in corporate doctrine to
speak of allocative norms as defining the "interests of the entity"
and to think of distributive norms as a matter of the "personal" or
"individual" interests of the constituents.57 For example, in the
shareholder suit context, it is customary to say that claims belong
to the corporation (i.e., are derivative) if they concern injury "to
the whole body of [the entity's] stock or property without any
severance or distribution among shareholders". By contrast,

57

There is a parallel tendency to think of fiduciary norms as duties to
maximize a unitary interest, as opposed to duties to make a fair division among
interests. The duty to maximize may be the most distinctive feature of fiduciary
norms, but when there is more than one beneficiary, a plausible conception of
fiduciary duty has to involve both types of norms. (Even with a single
beneficiaries, the trustee's rights to compensation and other benefits have to be
measured in terms of fairness.) See Robert Clark's helpful discussion
distinguishing between fiduciary duties to be "loyal" on the one hand and "fair"
on the other. Corporate Law 635-36 (1986).
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claims are direct "when the shareholder suffers injury separate and
distinct from that suffered by other shareholders."58
This mode of thought has powerful consequences when its
narrow conception of corporate interests is used to define the scope
of the lawyer's responsibility to an organizational client. We see
this in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. The
Restatement provision on organizational representation
substantially tracks Model Rule 1.13, but adds some examples.
According to one of them, where a corporate manager asks the
lawyer to draft a document making a gift of a new car owned by
the corporation to a social friend, the request is against the interests
of the corporation and must be refused. On the other hand, where
a controlling shareholder attempts to unlawfully dilute the value of
minority shares, the injury is considered individual, and the lawyer
is to remain passive.59
Presumably, the difference rests on the form of the actions.
The sale is formally a transaction between the corporation and a
third party; the dilution occurs through internal corporate action.
But there is no reason of policy or principle to classify the two
situations differently for the purposes professional responsibility.
From the constituent's points of view, the economic effect of the
two types of action is the same -- the value of her stake in the
enterprise has been diminished. It is no consolation to her that in
one case the wrongful act takes an intracorporate form. Nor is
there any reason to think that one category of injury is more or less
frequent, severe, or hard to detect than the other. Moreover, the
distinction is quite manipulable. When the stakes are large,
constituents with extensive control will often be able to find some
intracorporate process to achieve most improper goals.60
58

12B W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations sec.
5911 (Rev. perm. ed. 1984).
59
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers sec. 96, Illustration 1 at
179-80, Illustration 2, at v. 2, pp. 183-84.
60
For example, instead of having management sell corporate assets to
herself at bargain prices (thereby triggering corporate injury and counsel duty),
she can cause the corporation to be merged with a controlled entity under terms
in which the minority receives less than fair value for its shares (thereby
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Virtually all intracorporate disputes are distributive. This is
literally so in the sense that the distribution of control is always in
issue in a dispute among corporate constituents. It is virtually true
in the sense that nearly all tenacious disputes involve economic
conflicts of interests. Corporate disagreements rarely become
disputes and almost never reach the courts when they are simply
matters of disinterested differences of opinion over how to
maximize aggregate benefits to residual claimants. Thus, to
identify the organizational interests solely with allocative norms is
to suggest these norms are largely irrelevant to constituent
disputes.
From the perspective of both client and lawyer, the
organization can only be regarded as a unity if appears to reconcile
the interests of its participants. No one would become a corporate
constituent if he did not envision arrangements that promised both
an aggregate return to the group and a fair share of it for him.
Professional responsibility doctrine could not permit simultaneous
representation of the constituents if there were not some set of
norms under which collaboration would be mutually beneficial.
From both perspectives, the distinction between allocative and
distributive norms is unimportant. Both are fundamental to the
Framework of Dealing that constitutes the organization.
It is dangerous to think of this framework of dealing as a
contract because the word has connotations of arm's length
relations and literalistic interpretation that are inappropriate here.
But the techniques through which the framework of dealing is
elaborated and applied are contractual. These techniques are
illustrated in a broad range of judicial opinions, but the illustrations
are often misleading because the interests involved are
mischaracterized.
Consider, for example, two well-known cases about
dividends. Sinclair v. Levien involved the Venezuelan subsidiary
triggering merely individual injury and excusing counsel of responsibility). In
theory, this could be done for particular assets by transferring them to a
subsidiary, distributing the subsidiary stock to the parent shareholders, and then
merging the subsidiary with a controlled entity.

49

SIMON

of a multinational oil company.61 The parent owned 97 percent of
its shares; public shareholders held the remaining three percent.
The parent-controlled board stopped new investments in
Venezuela and began paying out the large revenues from past
investments there as dividends. Minority shareholders claimed
that Sinclair and the board breached fiduciary duties by failing to
reinvest. They noted that Sinclair had made large investments
through other subsidiaries in Alaska, Canada, and Paraguay that
could have been made through Sinven. The Delaware Chancellor
had characterized the board's actions as interested-director
transactions and had put the burden on the defendants to show that
they were fair. The appellate court disagreed, holding that so long
as all shareholders received dividends pro rata, there was no
conflict of interest, and hence the decisions were protected as
business judgments.
Smith v. Atlantic Properties62 involved a close corporation
in which three of four shareholder-directors charged the fourth
with breach of fiduciary duty for refusing to permit the payment of
a dividend. Under the Articles, board action could be taken only
with the agreement of all four directors. For several years, they
deadlocked, 3-1, over whether to reinvest earnings, as the
defendant desired, or pay them out, as the plaintiffs desired.
Unfortunately, the deadlock prevented the firm from taking either
course and caused it to incur tax penalties for unnecessary
accumulation of income. The court held that the defendant had
breached a fiduciary duty by deadlocking the board, and held it
liable for these penalties. The court seemed influenced by the
suggestion that the defendant, who was wealthier than the
plaintiffs, was motivated by a desire to avoid personal income
taxes he would have had to pay on dividends.
In both cases, the court speaks as if the controversy among
shareholders is to be resolved in terms of some corporate interest
that transcends constituent interests. It finds that the parent in
Sinclair had no conflict of interest in the dividend decision, and it
61
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280 A.2d 717 (1971).
422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. 1981).
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holds that the Smith defendant was wrong to consider his
conflicting individual interest. But in both cases, if we put
distributive norms aside, there is no corporate interest independent
of the constituent interests. A rational dividend decision should
take account of the opportunity costs and tax positions of the
constituents. In each of the two cases, we have separate groups of
shareholders with differing opportunity costs or tax positions, and
hence, different interests. The Sinven court was wrong to deny
that Sinclair had a conflict of interest. Since its opportunities were
broader than those of the public shareholders, its interests were
different. Similarly, the Smith court was wrong to suggest that it
was per se illegitimate for the defendant to consider his personal
tax position. The decision had to be based on at least some
constituents' personal interests because there were no other
relevant interests. A decision for the majority was a decision that
their interests were entitled to precedence.
When constituent interests conflict as they do in these
cases, we have to look to distributive norms to resolve the conflict.
When the norms are not explicit, we can use contractual techniques
of implicit interpretation. While neither case makes an effort to
articulate the relevant distributive norm, each indicates some
relevant evidence.
In Sinven, the salient fact is the unusual shareholder
structure. Why would the multinational sell only a three percent
interest in the Venezuelan subsidiary? This move could not have
yielded significant capital. The most salient explanation is that the
offering was designed to facilitate some local shareholding for
regulatory or political purposes. If that was the purpose, it would
be relevant only to Venezuelan investments. This suggests that the
public shareholders had no reasonable expectation that Sinven
would be a vehicle for them to participate in non-Venezuelan
investments.
In Smith, the salient fact is the unanimity voting rule,
which the case tells us was agreed to at the insistence of the
defendant and apparently in the knowledge that he was more
affluent than the others. The question then is whether the tax
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contingency that prompted the defendant's vetoes was within the
range of issues that the parties should have expected the veto to be
available for. If, as the facts recited by the court suggest, everyone
should have understood that this was one of the defendant's
reasons for bargaining for the veto, then they should not now be
permitted to object.
From a distributive point of view, the Sinven decision for
the defendants seems right; the Smith decision for the plaintiffs
seems wrong. Perhaps if we had more facts, these conclusions
might change. The key point is that each case should be decided,
not through a search for transcendent corporate interests, but by
recognizing that the relevant stakeholder interests conflict and
trying to find a distributive norm that indicates which ones should
prevail.
The Delaware and Massachusetts courts resisted
acknowledging the distributive nature of the conflicts in these
cases because of the conventional tendency to see fiduciary duties
as not embracing distributive issues. They were right to assume
that the norms that constitute the "entities" involved in the cases
should speak to issues as basic as the ones raised. But corporate
norms can only address such issues plausibly if they include
distributive as well as allocative ones.
As a further example of consequences of personifying the
corporation in a way that treats distributive norms as external,
return to one of the Restatement hypotheticals.63 We are asked to
suppose a lawyer representing a close corporation with a dominant
shareholder. The dominant shareholder has asked the board,
consisting entirely of its designees, to adopt a plan to repurchase
shares under terms that a minority shareholder protests will
substantially reduce the value of his stock. The hypothetical tells
us that under state law a dominant shareholder owes a fiduciary
duty to a minority not to cause directors to take action that
substantially reduces the value of the latter's stock. It concludes
that the lawyer is "not obliged to advise against or otherwise seek
63
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to prevent action that is consistent with the board's duty to the
client."
While the text is written with the circumlocution that is a
hallmark of the bar's treatment of such issues, it seems to assume
that a board action induced by a dominant shareholder in breach of
a shareholder's duties to a minority could somehow be "consistent
with the board's duty to" the corporation. The language is
ambiguous as to whether it assumes this will always be the case or
only sometimes. It offers no authority and suggests no analysis as
to how one might go about determining whether and when it might
be the case. It seems to rest on simply the conventional
assumption that a violation of distributive norms is not an injury to
the corporation.
The implausibility of this premise is magnified in a further
factual variation.64 We are now asked to assume that the
repurchase plan is not disclosed to the minority, but that the
minority will probably learn of it and challenge it successfully in a
"suit against the Client, and that Client will likely incur substantial
expense as a result." In these circumstances, the drafters assert, the
lawyer "owes a duty to protect the Client." (How much of a duty
is unclear, since the only action mentioned is "advising the Client's
board against adopting the plan.")
Many will find difficult to square with any recognizable
concept of ethics the negative implication that, if the minority
never learns of the unlawful conduct and is thus unable to
challenge it successfully, the lawyer's duty to oppose it does not
arise. The Restatement seems to say that the lawyer must oppose
the unlawful conduct only if it seems unlikely that the wrongdoers
are going to get away from it. Although preposterous as ethics,
this position follows from an understanding of corporate
personality that excludes distributive norms. Note also the further
bizarre implication that the injury to the corporation, in the event
the wrongdoing is blocked, arises only from having to bear
litigation expense. If the wrongdoer commits to reimburse such
64
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expenses in the event of discovery and loss, does that obviate the
lawyer's duty?
The conventional view, in a largely tacit and unreflective
way, sees the corporation as a set of norms that promote a
collaborative effort to maximize joint gains but invite a Hobbesian
free-for-all with respect to how they are divided. But distributive
norms are just as fundamental and integral as allocative ones to the
coherence and viability of the organization.
3. The Irrelevance of the Direct/Derivative Distinction
The strongest corporate law influence on professional
responsibility is the practice of distinguishing entity from
individual constituent interests that persists today largely in
connection with derivative suits. A breach of duty to corporate
interests is supposed to be litigated as a derivative suit; a breach of
duty to constituent interests is supposed to be litigated as an
individual suit or a class action. The distinctions between corporate
and individual are incoherent and anachronistic. They have no
strong connection even to the procedural purposes for which they
are primarily invoked, much less to professional responsibility
values.
As we've noted, derivative suit doctrine purports to draws
the line between corporate and individual in terms of harm to all
shareholders/harm to some shareholders. But this and related
distinctions have not been applied meaningfully or consistently. A
suit to compel a dividend or to enjoin an unauthorized act is
usually considered direct, even though all shares are affected
equally. A challenge to self-dealing by an officer who holds a
majority of shares is treated as derivative, even though as a
practical matter, only the minority shares have a stake in it. A
challenge to a dilutive merger might be considered derivative if the
complaint emphasizes the harm to share price; it might be
considered individual if the complaint emphasizes the diminution
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of voting rights.65 A claim that a controlling shareholder has
impaired the value of minority shares by excluding them from a
holding company is direct; a claim that the same actions represent
the usurpation of a corporate opportunity might be derivative.66
The cases disagree about the proper categorization of
disputes over dividends, merger prices, dissolution, rejection of
acquisition bids, and unauthorized acts.67
Moreover, the distinctions do not serve the relevant
practical goals of litigation procedure. The practical issues at stake
are whether the plaintiff will have to post security for the
defendant's expenses, whether corporate management's judgment
that the suit should not proceed will be given weight by the court,
whether the recovery will go to the corporation or the individual
plaintiffs, and whether a judgment will bind all shareholders.
Traditionally, in a derivative suit, the plaintiff must post security,
the board gets deference, recovery goes to the corporation, and all
shareholders are bound. The opposite consequences follow from
characterization as direct. However, the class action device has
made it possible to bind all shareholders in a direct suit in most
situations where it is desirable to do so, and for years, the courts
have been recognizing that the other consequences produced by the
traditional doctrine often don't make sense. Thus, they have
created exceptions. For example, even if a suit is derivative, the
recommendation to dismiss of a severely conflicted board will not
get deference. And if wrongdoers are in control of the corporation,
recovery, even if deemed derivative, will go to the plaintiffs. This
process by which the court determines the procedural incidents of
the lawsuit by referring directly to the relevant values will in all
likelihood continue.
There is a useful role for the distinction between allocative
and distributive norms in determining the scope of constituent
65

Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).
Note, "Jones v. Ahmanson: The Fiduciary Obligations of Majority
Shareholders," 70 Columbia Law Review 1079, 1089-90 (1970).
67
For an overview with citations, see Cox et al., cited in note , at 40006.
66

55

SIMON

discretion to bring suits over corporate policy. A purely allocative
dispute involves no economic conflict of interest; it is just a
disagreement over business policy. A presumption against judicial
intervention in such cases makes sense. The "business judgment
rule" expresses such a presumption as a matter of substantive law.
A disinterested decision by management not to assert a potential
corporate claim against a stranger to the corporation, for example,
ought to carry a stronger presumption of non-reviewability than a
decision with internal distributive consequences.
If the
derivative/direct distinction had been employed simply to limit
judicial review of allocative disputes, it might serve some purpose.
But it has not been. As we've noted, most disputes that reach
litigation are distributive, and the doctrine characterizes many of
them as derivative.
If the direct/derivative distinction has very little connection
to the procedural issues at stake in corporate litigation, it has
nothing to do at all with most issues of corporate professional
responsibility. The tendency to define the scope of the corporate
lawyer's obligations in terms of the norms associated with
derivative suits is fruitless and arbitrary.
B. Doctrinal Applications
Although the Framework-of-Dealing perspective is a
departure from the dominant doctrinal tendencies on organizational
representation, it does seem to be presupposed in a few specific
doctrinal areas. These areas seem anomalies in the dominant
terms. The Framework-of-Dealing perspective gives a better
explanation of them than conventional doctrine can offer.
1. Insider Trading.
As applied to lawyers, the insider trading prohibition
illustrates a duty to a corporate client that depends on substantive
fiduciary notions, rather than the factors emphasized by the
Control Group and Authority Structure models. Neither officers
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nor the board, nor perhaps any corporate body, could authorize the
trading prohibited by this norm. The norm also illustrates the
inadequacy of the conception of corporate interest that professional
responsibility has inherited from traditional corporate law.
The insider trading prohibition is a mandatory term
supplied by federal securities law, but it has been explicitly derived
from and elaborated in terms of fiduciary duty.68 Yet, prior to the
advent of the federal doctrine, state cases found liability in only
some of the circumstances covered by the current prohibition. If
the insider affirmatively misled, liability to the party with whom
she traded might be supported by conventional misrepresentation
doctrine. Where the trading caused some tangible loss to the
corporation -- for example, by causing premature disclosure of a
business strategy -- liability to the corporation might be based on
this harm. But in the core situation where the insider simply trades
anonymously without disclosing material information, the courts
tended to reject liability. They would say that the insider's duty
was to the corporation not to the shareholder she traded with and
that, since the only effect of the trade was to shift wealth around
among the shareholders, there was no corporate harm.69
The federal doctrine, which extended liability to the core
case, gained broad public acceptance, and some state courts
incorporated its principles into state doctrine. However, when
economics came to the fore in business law scholarship in the
1970s, the core case once again seemed problematic, at least for
academics. Law-and-economics scholars thought corporate law
should be based on efficiency considerations, and they had
difficulty finding any that supported the prohibition. Eventually,
they came up with some. For example, the prohibition makes for
more explicit forms of executive compensation which tend to be
more certain, and hence more efficient; it eliminates the incentive
for managers to increase firm volatility in order to maximize
trading opportunities.70 These rationales are, however, quite
68
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speculative and do not seem to be the ones that most strongly
motivate public support for the prohibition. The economists'
preoccupations with efficiency parallels traditional corporate
doctrine's tendency to define distributive concerns as external to
the corporation.
Yet, the reasons that most strongly motivate public support
seem to be distributive. Information gained in corporate service is
considered a collective asset in which constituents should share in
proportion to their stakes. Moreover, it is generally regarded
incompatible with fiduciary loyalty to profit secretly on
information gained in a position of trust. This principle is a
traditional one in the law of trusts.71 It seems to be equally
grounded in lay opinion.
On the Framework-of-Dealing
perspective, these distributive convictions provide ample ground
for interpreting the corporate residual claim contract to include the
prohibition.
Thus, the insider trading approach is consistent
with the contractual methodology of the Framework-of-Dealing
approach, and it confirms the premise that a corporation should be
understood to have interests in the integrity of its distributive
structure.
2. Derivative Suit Defense
It is generally held that a derivative suit alleging
wrongdoing by incumbent management can present a conflict that
precludes joint representation of management and the
corporation.72 In these situations, corporate counsel must either
withdraw from representing the corporation in order to represent
the managers, or the managers must retain separate counsel. The
doctrine does not specify when separate representation is required.
However, one factor that has been deemed relevant is the strength
of the claim. Joint representation has been deemed appropriate
when the claim is patently weak, especially if likely to be
71
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dismissed in an early proceeding.73 In other words, the lawyer first
makes a preliminary assessment of the merits; if she is unable to
determine them she, or whomever else represents the corporation,
must remain neutral.
It is not clear how much practical importance these
doctrines have. Whoever represents management will have full
access to corporate information and will very likely be paid out of
the corporate treasury. Corporate counsel will still be chosen by
management, and within limits will continue to be instructed by it.
(Corporate counsel may, for example, orchestrate the
establishment of an ostensibly "independent" committee of
directors or advisors to assess the merits of the claims on behalf of
the corporation.)
Nevertheless, the doctrine is interesting because it seems to
reflect the Framework-of-Dealing conception of representation. It
departs from the Control Group view in refusing to identify
corporate with management interests, and it departs from the
Authority Structure view both in acknowledging that authority is
ambiguous in this situation and in suggesting that consideration of
the substantive merits of an internal dispute can sometimes enable
a reliable determination of what the corporation's interests are. In
deciding that joint representation is appropriate in the case of
frivolous claims, the lawyer is deciding that management's position
is most consistent with the Framework-of-Dealing. Where the
claim is nonfrivolous, neutrality is required because the absence of
a determinate Framework makes it impossible to determine what
client interests are.74
73
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3. Duties to Nonshareholder Constituents: The S & L Cases
The Control Group and Authority Structure perspectives
are not responsive to the interests of constituents who have neither
actual control nor a role in the corporation's authority structure.
Many people believe a board's fiduciary duties extend to a variety
of shareholder constituencies, including employees, customers,
suppliers, and the local communities in which they operate. These
suggestions are controversial, though there is some support for
them in "other constituency statutes" and some takeover cases. In
addition, there is significant judicial support for the notion that
board has fiduciary duties to creditors when the corporation is in
the vicinity of insolvency.75
Those who deny that duties extend to nonshareholder
constituencies will not be interested in pursuing the implications of
these duties for corporate lawyers. Moreover, one might concede
the validity of the board duties and still suggest that they are too
indeterminate to yield any conclusions for lawyer responsibility.
However, some of the cases recognizing possible liability for
lawyers and accountants involved in the Savings and Loan failures
of the 1980s might be read to suggest the contrary. Opinions in
some of these cases suggested that lawyers and accountants
breached duties to the corporation by failing to take actions to
protect creditors from the financial improprieties of managers.76
411 U.S. 986 (1973). However, one case could be read to support it. Jacuzzi v.
Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc., 218 Cal. App.2d 24, 32 Cal. Rptr. 188 ( ).
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The cases were brought by receivers and bankruptcy trustees.
They do not explicitly suggest a lawyer duty to make disclosures to
creditors, but the conduct on which the claims were based seems to
have harmed creditors, not shareholders.77
For example, F.D.I.C. v. O'Melveny & Myers involved the
fraud in sale of real estate interests by the senior managers and sole
owners of the corporation. After reimbursing the purchasers, the
receiver sued the lawyers, alleging that they had breached a duty to
the corporation by failing to discover and take action with respect
to the fraud. The lawyers argued that the corporation had "no
identity separate from that" of the two owner-managers.78 The
court replied that the bank had a "corporate identity distinct from
that of its wrongdoing officers"79 and ruled for the receiver.
In F.D.I.C. v. Nathan, senior managers who owned 90
percent of the common stock engaged in fraudulent transactions.
Again, the receiver sued the lawyers for breach of duty to their
client in assisting and "failing to warn any nonculpable party"80 of
the misconduct. The lawyers argued that they could not be liable
for conduct "ratified by at least ninety percent of Continental's
shareholders."81 The court rejected the argument.
To be sure, some cases hold that the corporation, and hence
the bankruptcy trustee, is "estopped" to bring suit where the
wrongdoing was the responsibility of senior management.82 But
the cases we are considering hold otherwise. To hold that suit is
possible is to invoke something like the Framework-of-Dealing
conception of the corporation. These cases imply that the
corporation has a set of interests for which fiduciaries are
responsible that is independent of its control and authority
structure. The conduct in question is attributable to the control
group and it is authorized in a procedural sense. In cases like
77
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O'Melveny and Nathan, the "highest authority that can act on
behalf of the corporation", to use the language of Model Rule 1.13,
is responsible for it. In others, the claim is that lawyers failed to
report officer conduct to the board, but in most of these cases, there
appears little likelihood that such reporting would have made any
difference.
One feature of the cases that has troubled the courts is that,
even where the illegal conduct was not undertaken directly by
shareholders, it was usually undertaken by managers attempting to
benefit shareholders, and it would have benefited shareholders if it
had been successful. To be sure, in hindsight things worked out
badly for shareholders, but manager efforts to advance shareholder
interests are usually assessed ex ante and given much deference.
For this reason, the Seventh Circuit holds that professional liability
for breach of duty to the corporation for internally authorized
conduct requires a showing that the mangers were acting to further
their own personal interests at the expense of shareholdlers.83
The holding makes sense if the only constituent interests
that constitute the corporation's identity as a client are shareholder
interests. However, there is growing authority to the effect that
creditors should be considered constitutive as the corporation
approaches insolvency.84 The reasoning is consistent with the
Framework-of-Dealing perspective. In that view, the corporation
is an implicit contractual structure that organizes the interests of
residual claimants. The creditors have a kind of contingent residual
claim that may be perfected in bankruptcy. But until then, many
actions potentially beneficial to shareholders would subject these
contingent interests to severe risk. The closer the firm gets to
insolvency, the greater the weight creditors claims should be
entitled relative to shareholder claims. Thus, the S & L cases
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finding professional liability make sense on the premise that
creditors are among the relevant constituents in this situation.
VI. The Entity Approach Summarized and Compared
A. An Integrated Entity Approach
It is possible, but not defensible, to apply either the Control
Group or the Authority Structure model alone as a comprehensive
guide to the responsibilities of the organizational lawyer. The
Framework-of-Dealing approach, however, presupposes the other
two.
The Control Group view contributes a presumption that
senior management and the board represent the organization. It is
based in part on management's authority to make ordinary business
decisions and the board's authority to make policy decisions. (To
this extent, it overlaps the Authority Structure approach.) It is also
based on the fact that across a broad range of decisions
management's incentives are well aligned with those of other
constituents, and management is likely to be better informed than
any other decisionmaker. This range consists mainly of allocative
decisions -- those that affect shareholders in equal proportion to
their distributive shares. Finally, the presumption is based on the
psychological tendency of lawyers to identify the organization with
the agents with whom she works, and the fact that this tendency
facilitates valuable communication and collaboration.
The Control Group presumption should not be a strong one.
It clearly should not survive indications that management is
violating authority or fiduciary norms. Moreover, it should be
rebutted in situations involving distributive issues where
management might have a conflict of interest. This should include
situations of actual constituent conflict but also situations of
potential constituent conflict, in particular, situations in which it
seems likely that there would be conflict if material information
not available to constituents were provided.
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Where the presumption is not dispositive, attention should
shift to procedural norms, the focus of the Authority Structure
perspective. The lawyer asks to which agents the corporate legal
structure confers ultimate responsibility over the issue. Where the
lawyer has substantial doubts that a particular course of corporate
conduct is in the interests of the organization, and the conduct has
not been given informed consideration by the agents with ultimate
authority, the lawyer ought not to assume that those engaged in the
conduct speak for the corporation and should facilitate review by
the agents with authority. In the most common case, this would
involve urging management to seek board authority. In a more
extreme case, it would involve by-passing management and going
to the board. A still more extreme course would be to make direct
contact with shareholder constituencies, and at the limit, public
authorities.
Where authority is ambiguous or disputed, the Authority
Structure perspective implies that the lawyer ought to try to
facilitate clarification of it. This would most commonly mean
assuring that all the relevant constituents have material
information. It would be consistent with this principle, for
example, for counsel representing the corporation in a derivative
suit to oversee the corporation's response to discovery requests
with a view toward insuring the availability of material
information. (Whether it is realistic to expect counsel to do this in
a manner independent of incumbent management is another
question.)
Some cases require analysis to proceed beyond authority
considerations. Although perhaps not often, it will sometimes
happen that the lawyer can say confidently that the decision of the
"highest authority" violates an important duty. This is most likely
to occur when the duty protects interests that are not represented in
the authority structure, for example, minority shareholders or
creditors. Here the lawyer has to make a substantive judgment
about the corporation's interests and responsibilities. Disclosure to
the affected constituent or a public authority might be the most
plausible remedy.

64

ORGANIZATIONAL LAWYERING

With respect to conflicts, the Framework-of-Dealing
approach implies neutrality in intra-corporate disputes where the
lawyer cannot confidently make a judgment on the merits. On the
other hand, in situations where the lawyer can make such a
decision, she probably should be authorized to take sides with the
stronger claimant, whether management or dissident. Current
doctrine already provides this in derivative suits where the
plaintiff's claim is frivolous. It may be that an apparent lack of
merit that does not rise (descend) to frivolousness should be
sufficient. In any event, there is no reason why the doctrine should
not be symmetrical, so that lawyers can ally with dissidents when
their claims are strong. To be sure, it may be hard to police the
reasonableness and good faith of lawyer judgments of merit, but
there is no reason to think lawyers are more likely to be wrong
when they side with dissidents than when they stick with
management.
As for attorney-client privilege, the current Wolfenbarger
rule seems well adapted to the Framework-of-Dealing perspective.
It contemplates an assessment of organizational interests that
includes the substantive merit of the claim of exactly the sort that
this perspective recommends.
Finally, where the lawyer has dealings regarding corporate
matters outside the authority structure, the Framework-of-Dealing
perspective prescribes duties of disclosure and fair dealing to
constituents. This is consistent with the specific prescriptions of
current doctrine, but the Framework-of-Dealing view provides a
better explanation of these prescriptions than the alternatives.
B. Joint v. Entity Representation
The Framework-of-Dealing approach thus converges with
Joint Representation more often than conventional discourse
assumes. In the Founder Freeze-Out, the two approaches both
suggest disclosure of the accountant's information and both are
likely to lead the lawyer to disqualify herself in the dispute
between the Founder and the Investor-dominated board.
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Nevertheless, there are important differences in both
premises and operating effect.
In the joint representation
perspective, disclosure is required because the representation
entails a commitment to provide material information to each
constituent. In the entity perspective, disclosure is required
because it is needed to trigger the decisionmaking processes to
determine the entity's interests.
In the joint representation approach, neutrality is required
because the lawyer cannot represent a client in a matter adverse to
another client, and even if the lawyer were allowed to withdraw
from representing the Founder, she would be forbidden to
represent a client against a former client in a matter substantially
related to the former representation. In the Framework-of-Dealing
perspective, neutrality is required because, if the lawyer cannot
determine, the merits of the claim, she cannot determine what the
interests of the client are. For the purposes of this dispute, there is
simply no client to represent.
In the Joint Representation approach interests are largely a
function of the individual desires and expectations of constituents.
Howevermuch they converge at the outset of the venture, they may
diverge in the course of it. In the Framework-of-Dealing
perspective, interests are defined in substantial part by the
framework, which will have substantial definition and continuity.
The lawyer's disclosure responsibilities to constituents will
be substantially limited by the framework. A decision made by
officers who are acting within their authority and disinterested -- a
classic "business judgment" -- normally does not raise disclosure
issues within the Framework of Dealing.
Moreover, in the Framework-of-Dealing approach there
will sometimes be collective interests defined by the Framework
that compete with interests in disclosure. In a public corporation,
if disclosure would necessarily become public and likely entail
adverse consequences for the corporation, those consequences
should be weighed. It is doubtful that such concerns could every
justify acquiescence in clear wrongdoing, but they might warrant a
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higher threshold of certainty and materiality for disclosure in such
situations.
For issues of attorney-client privilege, the Wolfenbarger
approach mandates just this kind of balancing inquiry, but since
the matter is in court, it can be performed by the judge.
Wolfenbarger presupposes an entity. No issue of attorney-client
privilege arises as between joint clients.
The Framework-of-Dealing will also limit client identity
for conflicts purposes. Consider first conflicts among constituents.
If the representation is joint, any substantial conflict will require
neutrality by the lawyer. On the other hand, if the lawyer
represents an entity, the lawyer need not withdraw if he can
determine that the action in question is consistent with the
authority and substantive norms of the Framework-of-Dealing.
With respect to conflicts between constituents and
outsiders, whether representation is joint or organizational may
affect the lawyer's ability to represent outsiders. Model Rule 1.7
on concurrent conflicts prevents representation of any client in a
matter adverse to any other client, without both clients' consent. In
a joint representation, this would preclude representing anyone
with a claim adverse to any of the enterprise participants, even if
the claim was unrelated to the business. In the Framework-ofDealing approach, the lawyer represents constituents only
collectively and in regard to the affairs of the business. Thus, an
adverse claim against a constituent unrelated to the business would
not be precluded.
The rules on successive conflicts will usually bar
representation of any joint client against another over a matter
relating to the enterprise. The result will be the same under the
Framework-of-Dealing approach if the lawyer is unable to
determine with confidence the merits of the dispute. There may,
however, be situations where the lawyer can determine the merits
with confidence, and there the Framework-of-Dealing supports the
lawyer in siding with the meritorious claim. This constituent can
plausibly claim to be speaking for the enterprise.
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One area where the choice between the two
characterizations should make less difference than current
discourse supposes is the scope of the lawyer's duty to offer
advice. There's a tendency to assume that the lawyer in a joint
representation will have to advise the constituents on individual as
well as collective interests, while the organizational lawyer will
have duties only with respect to the latter. For example, in
Security Bank v. Klicker,85 the plaintiff was a member of a
partnership in which all partners were asked to guarantee
personally a partnership debt. When he ended up getting stuck
with the liability, he complained that the partnership lawyer had
not adequately advised him of the risks. The Court dismissed on
the familiar ground that the partnership lawyer did not represent
the partners individually.
However, the decision should not turn on this distinction.
The opinion reflects the tendency to assume, from the
organizational perspective, that the organization's interests are in
maximizing its aggregate resources, while the constituent's interest
in fair treatment is a purely "individual" one. I criticized this
premise above with respect to cases involving internal corporate
action. This case is slightly different in that it is not strictly
internal. In effect, it involves a re-negotiation of the Frameworkof-Dealing, rather than a move within it. The existing Framework
will not dictate a particular outcome to the negotiation. On the
other hand, there are general norms of fair dealing, including
disclosure of material information, that could plausibly be
considered part of the Framework. These norms might well
include some consideration of particular interests of a constituent.
We saw, for example, in considering dividend decisions that
corporate decisionmaking sometimes requires consideration of
individual interests, such as tax constraints. The fiduciary duties
imposed by partnership law and the Wilkes cases on small business
constituents incorporate such norms in the Framework for the
purposes of constituent dealings inter se. And the insider trading
85

142 Wis.2d 289; 418 N.W.2d 27 (1987).
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prohibition illustrates that such norms can play a role even in large
businesses.
To be sure, there will be limits on the knowledge that an
organization's lawyer can be expected to have about constituent
interests or the degree of attention she can be expected to pay to
them. In some situations, the most that can be expected of the
lawyer is to suggest that the constituent should get separate
representation.86 The limits will be stricter the more idiosyncratic
the interests and the more numerous the constituents. But some
such limits would also apply in joint representation. Joint
representation does not mean that the lawyer is responsible for
every personal interest of each constituent.
Professional
responsibility norms authorize limitation of the scope of the
representation,87 and joint representation of constituents in
connection with a business venture will usually expressly or
impliedly be limited to matters related to that venture. In Klicker,
the interests around a personal guarantee of business debts would
be related, so the lawyer probably would have had some
responsibility for advice in connection with it.
But
characterization of the representation as organizational should not
preclude a duty to provide the same advice.
Where the distinction between joint and organizational
representation does matter, two considerations bear on the choice
of perspective. First, joint representation is most appropriate in
situations with small numbers of constituents and informal
dealings among them and with the lawyer.
Second, the
Framework-of-Dealing approach requires some minimal degree of
structure to the constituents' dealings and plans. The structure
need not be explicit, and much of it can be supplied by default and
mandatory terms, but the many informal relationships will lack
sufficient structure to be treated as Frameworks of Dealing.
86

An obligation the lawyer would sometimes owe even to a stranger.
Model Rule 4.3, Comment. (lawyer has duty to clarify role to "unrepresented
person" and may advise to obtain counsel).
87
Model Rule 1.2(c).
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The Founder Freeze-Out is a close case. The numbers are
small. I have been discussing the case as if there were only two
constituents, although one of them is an organization, a limited
partnership. Most start-ups with venture financing would have
considerably more than two constituents, but not so many as to
make joint representation impracticable. What weighs more
heavily against this approach is the degree of formality. Start-ups
are noted for flexible structure and collaborative style, but they are
extensively negotiated and elaborately documented.
The
participants are typically sophisticated about legal and business
issues. In the current state of doctrine, there is some pressure to
adopt the joint representation view because that would generate the
best chance of establishing a disclosure duty. But we have seen
that the most plausible version of the "entity" perspective supports
a disclosure duty in this situation just as strongly.
C. The Limited Potential of Client Prescription
Model Rule 1.13 states that among the factors to be
considered in determining duties to an organization are the
organization’s own policies concerning legal representation. The
American Trial Lawyers’ Association urges that corporate clients
instruct their counsel specifically as to how to act in the face of
internal conflicts.88 No doubt it would be helpful for clients to
consider such matters and try to formulate guidelines. It seems
unlikely, however, that such efforts will obviate the need for
judicially prescribed and enforced professional responsibility
doctrine on these matters.
Organizational clients have not shown much inclination to
address these issues through explicit policy, despite the fact that
most have some awareness of the problems. Even if they were, to
do so, their efforts would be subject to two sorts of limitations.

88

American Trial Lawyers’ Association, American Lawyers’ Code of
Conduct 2.5.
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First, as a matter of professional responsibility doctrine
clients cannot waive their rights to adequate representation.89
Moreover, any client agreement regarding representation is likely
to be deemed invalid or inapplicable with respect to unanticipated
future contingencies.90 Thus, even with specific organizational
policies, lawyers will have a continuing obligation to consider
what the best interests of the organization are in situations of
internal conflict.
Second, as a matter of corporate law, any policies adopted
by management that were inconsistent with their fiduciary duties
would be invalid.91 Policies that instructed lawyers not to disclose
material information to the board or other constituents who might
otherwise be entitled to it or to remain passive in the face of
serious wrongoing toward constituents might well be deemed
incompatible with fiduciary duty.
VII. Noncorporate Organizations
The argument so far suggests the distinction between joint
representation and a plausible conception of entity representation is
not as great as many have assumed. It also suggests that the most
important determinants in the choice of approach is, not formality
or organization, but whether these relationships have sufficient
structure to constitute a Framework of Dealing. Without such a
framework, plausible entity treatment is not possible. With it,
entity treatment will often be appropriate, though there may be
cases involving small, informal collaboration, where joint
representation is appropriate even with a Framework of-Dealing.
89

See Model Rule 1.2, Comment, par. 5 (client may not be asked to
waive right to competent representation).
90
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1978); In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944, 957 (N.D.Cal. 1897).
91
Even shareholder-adopted policicies would have this problem.
Although some states permit shareholders to waive managers’ duty of care
liability, none permits waiver of duty of loyalty liability in the broad prospective
sense that would be required to moot the issues with which we are concerned.
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Although never embraced explicitly and sometimes
rejected implicitly, this view turns out to be surprisingly consistent
with the trends in the treatment by courts and commentators of
professional responsibilities in a variety of organizational contexts.
A. Partnerships
In general, the courts have found it easier to apply the joint
representation perspective to support duties to constituents in the
partnership than in the corporate context.92 This may reflect the
greater legal informality of partnerships, the doctrine that partners
owe each other fiduciary duties, and the adoption in some states of
the "aggregate" (as opposed to the "entity") characterization of
partnerships.
On the other hand, other cases purport to take an "entity"
perspective, typically without elaboration, and a number of these
dismiss claims by partners for managerial expropriation, invoking
the entity concept with the same glib circularity we have seen in
close corporation cases such as Skarbrevik.93
There is no reason to make any strong distinction between
corporate and other business forms. The Framework-of-Dealing
approach seems as readily applicable to partnerships as
corporations, so long as they have the requisite degree of structure.
B. Personal Trusts

92

E.g, Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 312 (Cal. App., 4th Dist,
1995); Arpali v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E. 1335 (Ohio 1994); Griva v.
Davison, 637 A.2d 830 (D.C. App. 1994); Wortham v. Van Liew v. Superior
Court, 188 Cal. App. 927 (1987); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Roberts v. Heim, 123 F.R.D. 614 (N.D.Cal. 1988); see also ABA Formal
Opinion No. 91-361 (applying entity rhetoric but opining that material
information "may not be withheld from the individual partners").
93
E.g., Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. 1996); Richter v. Van
Amberg, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D.N.M. 2000); Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, 589 F.
Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Several cases consider the extent to which a lawyer for a
trustee is liable to the beneficiary for acquiescing in or assisting
injurious conduct. Liability for active tortious conduct for which a
stranger could sue is fairly uncontroversial. However, the kind of
liability for passivity and silence associated with fiduciaries has
been more controversial. Some courts deny liability on the ground
the trustee's lawyer owes no fiduciary duty to the beneficiary.
However, the recent trend has been to hold that such lawyers do
have some degree of fiduciary liability to beneficiaries.94
Geoffrey Hazard has discussed the recent cases in terms of
joint representation.95 Both trustee and beneficiary can be
considered as clients.
Conceptually, however, the joint
representation idea is an awkward fit because it implies client
consent and control, whereas beneficiaries don't consent to their
relations with trustee or lawyer or have control over them.
Emphasizing this problem, Jeffrey Pennell and Robert Tuttle
suggest that the lawyer should be conceived as representing a
"fiduciary entity". The fiduciary role has a structure of legal rules.
Pennell and Tuttle suggest it is to this structure that the lawyer
should be held accountable. They note that the fact that trustee and
beneficiary have conflicts of interest or that different beneficiaries
may have conflicting interests does not preclude envisioning a
coherent client. The lawyer's duty is not to the individual interests
of the participants, but to the convergent interests identified and
incorporated in the trust relationships.96
94

The cases are surveyed in Tuttle, cited in note
. The best known of
the cases finding duties to the beneficiary is Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d
988 (Ariz. 1976). See also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 51(4)
(lawyer for trustee should take actions necessary to prevent trustee from
breaching duty to beneficiary, with exceptions).
95
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An
Exploratory Analysis," 1 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 15 (1987).
96
"The attorney does not represent the beneficiaries' interest; she only
represents their 'best interests' as that concept is objectified in the fiduciary
entity." Tuttle, cited in note
, at 923; Jeffrey Pennell, "Representations
Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who is the Client?", 62 Fordham Law Review 13
19 (1994).
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Pennell's and Tuttle's "entity" approach corresponds closely
to the Framework of Dealing approach. The Authority Structure
model is of relatively little use with a personal trust, since authority
is usually unstructured and informal.
The Control Group
approach, which I suggested was of at most slight use with
business corporations, is of even less use with trusts, since the
trustee's control is more tightly hemmed by fiduciary obligation
than that of corporate directors and officers. But trusts do share
with corporations a substantive legal identity constituted by
mandatory, default, and privately adopted rules (with the
difference that the trust beneficiary does not participate in the
adoption process). The framework-of-dealing approach draws on
this structure.97
Privilege and conflicts doctrine associated with the
framework-of-dealing approach seems generally appropriate to
trust situations. The Wolfenbarger principles, which effectively
give the court control over the entity's attorney-client privilege in
disputes between entity and constituent seems readily adaptable to
trusts.98
97

The approach of section 51(4) of the Restatement is much less
satisfactory. It treats the beneficiary as a “nonclient” but gives the trustee’s
lawyer a duty to prevent wrongdoing by the trustee. This leads to one of those
studied ambiguities so often encountered in the bar’s doctrine on organizational
representation:
Since disclosure to or in the interests of nonclients is normally
authorized only in very limited situations, we need to know what the relation of
the beneficiary duty is to the normal confidentiality rules. A remark in the
Comments suggest that the normal confidentiality rules still apply (with the
trustee as the “client”) with the consequence that the lawyer will have very
limited in his ability to make disclosures and in some jurisdictions perhaps
entirely precluded from doing so. Thus, the duty apparently created by the rule
erodes as the nuances are considered.
98
Hoopes v. Carota, 543 N.E.2d 73 (N.Y. 1989) (applying Wolfenbarger
to beneficiary suit against trustee). A more categorical approach is applied to
trustees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Becher v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 129 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1997) ("an employer acting in
the capacity of ERISA fiduciary is disabled from asserting the attorney-client
privilege against plan beneficiaries on matters of plan administration"); but see
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For conflicts purposes, the entity perspective would treat
representation of the trustee in his official capacity as not creating
conflicts where the lawyer takes a position adverse to the trustee in
his personal capacity. Tuttle expresses reservations about this,
suggesting that the trustee is often more personally identified with
his office than the corporate officer.99 The trustee will often be a
single individual operating informally. But this is not categorically
true. The trustee could be a bank, and a close corporation officer
could be the only director and shareholder. Moreover, even in
large corporations, we have noted that lawyers have a tendency to
identify the client with the agents they work with.
C. Charitable Organizations
Charitable organizations usually take the legal forms of
trusts or nonprofit corporations. The Framework-of-Dealing
approach seems readily applicable here. These organizations
usually have a determinate plan of goals and activities, and their
managers' are subject to a structure that limits authority more than
that of business organizations.
An important contrast with business organizations is that
the most important beneficiaries of a charitable organization have
little or no control rights. In this they resemble, beneficiaries of
personal trusts, but since charitable beneficiaries are more diffuse
and their interests are more ambiguous, they typically have less
incentive and ability to monitor the organization. The law
responds to this limitation by giving supervisory responsibilities
over charities to the state Attorneys General, and if the
organizations receive tax subsidies, the Internal Revenue Service
and other taxing authorities. The resources of these agencies,
however, seem scant relative to their responsibilities.
Given the relative weakness of monitoring, it is arguable
that the professional responsibilities of lawyers are exceptionally
United States v. Mett
(9th Cir. 1999) (privilege does apply where
trustee consults counsel in anticipation of charges by beneficiaries).
99
Tuttle, cited in note , at 924.
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important in this sphere. Moreover, the deficiencies of a norm,
such as Model Rule 1.13 that precludes disclosure of wrongdoing
outside the organization are especially severe here. We have seen
that in the business corporation there are occasionally cases where
an affected constituency has no participatory role in the
organization's control structure, but this is the usual situation with
charitable organizations. Since the Attorney General has a critical
monitoring role, it is important that disclosure to him or her be
possible.
D. Informal Associations
In the past, doctrine has tended to draw a sharp distinction
between formally organized associations and informal ones. While
formally organized ones were treated as "entities", informal ones
were treated as joint individual representations. However, if entity
is understood in "Framework of Dealing" terms there is often good
reason to apply it in informal contexts. Where the parties have
developed a sufficient authority structure and sense of common
goals to permit a distinction between organizational and individual
interests, it may be possible to treat their activities as a framework
of dealing. To refuse to do so may impair their ability to act in a
coordinated fashion.
Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes give an example:
Seventeen homeowners retain a lawyer to bring a nuisance suit
against a factory. They agree in writing that the decision of twelve
of them to settle will be binding on all of them.100
If the
representation is considered joint, then the lawyer cannot act to
enforce the agreement if any of the seventeen reneges.101 A
100

Hazard and Hodes, Illustrations 5-11, 12-13, 17-2, at 5-35-36, 12-4445, 17-12-13. The example is based on Hayes v. Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Inc.,
513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding no agreement but suggesting that, even if
there had been one, it would not be binding).
101
Model Rule 1.2 (acceptance of settlement for client to decide); 3.8(f)
(settlement of claims for multiple clients permissible only if each client
consents).
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dissenter who took a position adverse to the others might also be
able to disqualify the lawyer from continuing to represent the other
group members.102 This treatment provides strong protection to
anyone who changes her mind. But it also may have real costs.
Some or all members of the group may not be willing to joint
without some assurance that all will be effectively bound. The
option of easy defection raises the expected costs of undertaking
the project in the first place.
While conceding that courts would be likely to apply joint
representation norms, Hazard and Hodes argue that it would be
better to treat the litigants as an organization and permit the lawyer
to act under Model Rule 1.13 on the instruction of twelve members
(the organization's "duly authorized" constituents). This is in the
spirit of Brandeis's "counsel for the situation" view. A Framework
of Dealing can be inferred from common understanding and
express agreement without formal organization.
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